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THE  TRANSITION  FROM  "BEWUSSTSEIN" 

TO  "SELBSTBEWUSSTSEIN'' 

IN 

Hegel's  Phenomenology  of  Mind 


AN  EXEGETICAL  ESSAY 

With  an  Introduction  and  With  Notes 


By 

Henry  Bradford  Smith 


A   Thesis  Presented  to  the  Fac«Ity  of  the  Graduate  School 

of  the  University  of  Pennsylvania,  in  Partial  Fwl- 

fillment    of    the    Requirements    for    the 

Degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy 


PrcM  of  B.  D.  Smhh  &  Brothers 
Pulaski,  Virginia 


PREFACE, 


np  HE  aim  of  this  essay  is  to  present  an  exegesis  of  the  early 

chapters  of  Hegel's  Phenomenology  of  Mind  in  a  phraseol-     ^ 
ogy,  which,  while  not  untechnical,  will  be  as  free  as  possible  of 
the  strange  and  often  mystifying  verbiage  of  Hegel. 

Hegel  is  perhaps  more  than  aoy  other  philosopher  the  pro- 
duct of  the  speculation  that  preceded  him,  and  it  would  thus 
seem  possible  to  reproduce  his  argument  in  terms  which  are  the 
common  property  of  philosophy  in  general.  The  advantage  of 
clearness  which  is  thus  attained  is  offset  by  the  impossibility  of 
an  exact  rendition.  It  is  impossible  to  render  the  author  in 
familiar  terms  without  more  or  less  perverting  his  meaning. 
Thus  the  commentators  have  in  general  been  content  to  restate 
the  argument  in  the  original  verbiage,  with  no  great  resulting 
advantage  to  clearness;  nor  is  the  reader  helped  if  the  author's 
style  be  imitated  in  a  language  other  than  the  German. 

Hegel  largely  invented  his  own  technical  vocabulary.  He 
was  doubtless  suspicious  of  the  ambiguity  of  the  terms  in  famil- 
iar use  and  aware  of  their  inadequacy  to  express  his  meaning. 
When  a  new  word  is  introduced  it  is  usually  delined,  but  the 
definition  will  in  itself  scarcely  render  the  meaning  intelligible 
to  the  reader.  It  is  only  after  the  term  has  appeared  many  times 
in  a  context  that  its  real  meaning  begins  to  appear.  Thus  the 
first  parts  of  the  system  may  only  become  clear  in  the  light  of 
the  last. 

The  Phenomenology  is  admittedly  one  of  the  most  difficult 
of  all  philosophical  works  and  the  present  essay  makes  no  pre- 
tense of  an  understanding  of  all  these  difficulties.  Moreover  the 
notions  that  are  philosophically  significant  will  be  subject  to  a 
multitude  of  interpretations  and  will  be  often  presentable  from 
many  points  of  view. 

It  is  with  the  belief  that  some  intelligible  system  of  interpre- 
tation, even  if  inexact  in  some  of  the  details,  is  better  than  no 
system,  or  a  system  exact  but  unintelligible,  that  the  present 
essaj;^  has  been  prepared. 


228333 


INTRODUCTION, 


npHB  interest  which  the  early  chapters  of  the  Phenomenol- 
ogy— viz.,  those  embracing  the  general  headings,  "con- 
sciousness" and  the  "self-consciousness" — possess,  lies  partly 
in  the  dialectic  transition  as  such,  and  partly  in  the  fact  that 
the  treatment  parallels  the  history  of  an  important  philosoph- 
ical concept,  the  ' '  Ding  an  sich  ' '  from  Kant  to  Fichte. 

The  chapter  on  the  "Certainty  of  Sense"  presents  what  is 
roughly  an  analysis  of  this  concept  as  it  presents  itself  in  the 
transcendentale  Aesthetik^.     This  of  course  is  the  part   of  the 
Critique  that  elaborates  the  theory  of  the  a  priori  forms  of  sensi- 
bility,   space  and    time,    which    are   supposed   to  account   for 
individuality.     This  chapter,  in  which  the   individual  takes  its 
place  as  a  "  thing  in  itself"  and  in  which  the  truth  of  the  cer- 
tainty of  sense  turns  out  to  be  the  universal,  is  a  fine  example  of 
Hegelian  skill.     In  the  next  chapter  "  the  thing  of  perception  " 
plaj^s  the  role  of  the  ^'Ding  an  sich'^    in  its   new   guise  in  the 
Analytik,"^  or   more  exactly  as  it   appears  in  the  corresponding 
part  of  the  Prolegomena,^  and  finally  the  chapter  on  "  Force  and 
the   Understanding"  presents   a   critique   of  the  concept  as  it^ 
exhibits  itself  generally  in  the  Dialectik^.     The  division  whichl 
deals  with  the  self- consciousness  owes  its  position  to  the  histor^ 
leal  fate  of  the  "  thing  in  itself"  in  the  ethical  idealism  of  Fichte.\ 
The  author  himself,  however,  seems  consciously  to  avoid  giving 
the  impression  that  this  order  is  in  mind;  and  indeed  the  obser- 
vation applies  only  to  the  whole  and  not  to  the  details,  many  of 
which  are  historical  standpoints  selected  freely  without  regard 
to  their  chronological  origin. 

The  ideal  of  rationalism  is  the  formulation  of  a  definition  of 
a  fact  from  which  the  fact's  existence  is  the  necessary  implica- 

1  Kant,  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft  (Originalausgabe),  S.  3S-73. 

2  Ibid,  S.  89-349. 

3  Ibid,  S.  349-732. 

*  Prolegomena  zu  einer  jeden  kunftigen  Metaphysik.etc.  (ed.  Reclam) ,  S.  73-1Q9. 


tion.  The  difficulty  of  the  rationalist's  position  seems  patent  to 
the  empiricist,  who  regards  his  fact  as  directly  given  in  experi- 
ence. It  is  the  custom  of  some  to  say  that  the  kind  of  philosophy 
one  chooses  depends  upon  what  kind  of  a  human  being  one 
happens  to  be.  If  temperamentally  one  prefers  reality  to  general 
information,  he  will  be  an  empiricist,  while  if  his  philosophic 
needs  compel  him  to  rank  the  whole  as  of  greater  interest  than 
the  part,  then  he  will  be  a  rationalist;  that  in  the  one  case  one 
prefers  to  submerge  himself  in  the  world  and  lose  himself,  with 
a  consequent  gain  in  reality,  while  in  the  other  case  one  elects 
to  elevate  himself  above  the  world  and  as  a  consequence  be  at  a 
loss  to  account  for  the  facts  of  experience.  One  must  make  up 
his  mind,  they  will  tell  you,  to  have  some  difficulties  at  hand  for 
which  his  system  cannot  hope  to  account.  The  situation  is  not 
without  humor  when  it  is  a  professed  empiricist  who  talks  in 
this  fashion,  for  reflection  seems  to  show  that  the  empiricist  is 
in  a  worse  way  for  his  fact  than  is  the  rationalist. 

Absolute  knowledge  viewed  as  the  limit  of  a  series  of 
approximations  may  be  regarded  as  attainable  if  the  series  have 
an  end;  unattainable  if  the  series  be  infinite.  In  the  latter  case 
the  philosopher  may  perhaps  regard  his  absolute  as  the  percept 
of  a  divine  intellect  or  resort  toa  "  pre-established  harmony  "  of 
his  primal  substance,  or  by  some  postulate  or  other  satisfy  this 
philosophic  need.  The  rationalist  either  regards  this  knowledge 
as  attained  when  his  definition  is  at  hand  (as  Descartes)  or  if  it 
be  the  last  of  a  series  of  definitional  implications,  its  attainment 
will  be  determined  by  whether  or  not  this  series  has  an  end. 
The  absolute  knowledge  of  Hegel  is  a  result  of  the  latter  sort. 
Of  course  the  author  is  not  necessarily  in  any  paragraph  giving 
an  expression  of  his  own  philosophical  opinion.  Usually  some 
historical  standpoint  is  being  considered  or  one  side  of  an  antith- 
esis is  being  developed.  The  true  Hegelian  view  is  to  be 
regarded  as  the  outcome  which  dialectic  deduces  from  the  clash 
of  conflicting  standpoints.  The  law  of  contradiction  is  for  the 
rationalist  the  supreme  canon  of  method.  The  object  (as  con- 
cept) whose  definition  implies  its  own  antithesis  is  nothing. 
The  dialectic  proceeds  until  through  definitional  implication, 
the  object  of  knowledge  is  defined  whose  truth  is  implied.    This 


object  is  the  absolute  and  is  thus  distinguished  from  all  other 
objects  of  consciousness  that  appeared  in  the  process,  for  the 
definition  of  each  one  of  these  is  conceived  as  involving  inherent 
contradiction. 

It  is  suggestive  to  recall  certain  passages  from  Schelling  in 
this  connection  as  making  clear  the  source  of  the  Hegelian  view 
as  thus  interpreted.     The  phenomena  of  the  path  of  the  dialectic 
are  the  conflicts  of  contradictory   opinions.     When  the  contra- 
diction is  removed,  the  phenomenon  (now  appearance)  ceases  to 
possess  reality;  it  vanishes  and  leaves  a  nothing.     Through  the 
dialectic  the  successive  scenes  of  conflict  are  left  behind  until 
through  flight  the  promised  land  of  the  absolute  is  reached.    For 
Schelling,  however,  to  attain  the  absolute  is  to  attain  pure  self- 
consciousness.      "  All  processes  of  the  mind  proceed    with  this 
in   view,  to  portray  the   infinite  in  the   finite.     The  end  of  all 
these  processes  is  the  self- consciousness,  and  the  history  of  these 
processes  is  nothing  but   the  history  of  the  self-consciousness. 
Every  process  of  the  soul  is  also  a  determinate  state  of  the  soul. 
The  history  of  the  human  mind  will   thus  be  nothing  but  the 
history  of  the  different  states  through  which  the  mind  gradually 
attains  unto    intuition  of  itself,  unto   pure  self-consciousness."^ 
And,  again:  ''Had  we  only  to  do  with  the  absolute  there  would 
never  have  arisen   a  conflict  of  different  systems.     Only  when 
we  have  left  the  domain  of  the  absolute  does  there  arise  a  conflict 
regarding  the  same,  and  only  because  of  this  original  conflict  in 
the  human  mind,  arise  the  conflicts  of  philosophers.     Should  it 
ever  happen — not  to  philosophers  but — to  mankind,  to  be  able  to 
leave  this  domain  in  which  they  have  lapsed  through  desertion 
of  the  absolute,  then  will  all  philosophy  and  that  domain  itself, 
cease  to  exist.     For  the  latter  originates  only  through  that  con- 
flict and   has  reality  only  so  long  as  the  conflict   continues."^ 
Again  to  quote  from  Fichte:  "  Epistemology  (  Wissenschaftslehre) 
is   necessary   not  alone  as   a   clearly  conceived,  systematically 
exhibited  science,  but  as  a  natural  predisposition — while  logic  is 

1  Werke,  Abth.  I.  Bd.   I,  S.  382,  Erlauterung  des   Idealismus  der  Wissenschaf- 

tslehre. 

2  Werke,  Abth.  I,  Bd.  I.   S.  293,  Philosophische  Briefe  iiber   Dogmatismus   \\n^ 

Kriticismus. 

W 


an  art- prod  act  of  the  human  mind  in  its  freedom."^  These 
passages  indicate  the  source  of  an  opinion  which  has  come  to  be 
regarded  as  typically  Hegelian. 

The  Phenomenology  begins  with  a  consideration  of  the  truth 
furnished  the  subject  by  the  fact  of  immediate  observation. 
When  a  series  of  observations  is  made  on  some  definite  quantity 
by  the  use  (say)  of  an  instrument,  as  is  well  known,  the  individ- 
ual observations  exhibit  discrepancies  among  themselves  and 
this  is  the  case  even  when  all  known  and  avoidable  sources  of 
error  have  been  removed.  It  is  the  custom  of  physical  science 
to  select  a  value  of  the  unknown  observed  quantity,  which  gives 
what  is  regarded  as  the  most  probable  value — the  nearest  approx- 
imation to  the  true  value  attainable  with  the  data  at  hand. 
This,  the  physicist  will  say,  is  in  answer  to  a  logical  demand — 
each  one  of  a  series  of  discordant  results  cannot  be  simultaneously 
true.  In  introducing  the  notion  of  error  in  this  way,  empirical 
science,  either  tacitly  or  openly,  postulates  a  real  fact  forever 
beyond  the  reach  of  knowledge  by  experiment. 

That  this  knowledge  is  unattainable  seems  to  be  a  matter  of 
experience^  for  while  small  errors  seem  to  occur  more  frequently 
than  large  errors  and  while  more  refined  methods  of  observation 
seem  to  give  more  exact  results,  even  if  the  object  observed  were 
the  same  from  moment  to  moment,  the  observer  is  not  the  same 
observer  that  he  was  a  moment  before.  However  this  may  be, 
it  follows  deHnitionally  from  the  manner  in  which  this  real  fact 
is  postulated  that  it  will  ever  remain  unknown,  for  if  an  in- 
creasingly large  number  of  observations  give  an  increasingly 
accurate  approximation  to  the  true  value  and  if  the  probable 
value  of  any  finite  number  of  observations  will  always  have  a 
probable  error  attached,  then  it  is  an  immediate  and  necessary 
inference  that  the  true  value  will  be  the  most  probable  value  of 
an  infinite  number  of  observations  and  that  this  true  value  has 
no  probable  error  attached.  But  an  infinite  number  of  observa- 
tions means,  if  it  means  anything,  a  greater  number  than  can 
ever  be  taken — an  infinite  number  of  observations  is  by  definition 
impossible.  Therefore  to  postulate  the  fact  thus  is  to  postulate 
it  unknowable — or  the  fact  is  unknowable  by  definition.  It  can- 
not be  said  that  the  limit  of  the  series  is  the  true  value,  for  the 

1  Werke  Abth.  L  Bd.  I,  S.  69,  Ueber  den  Begriff  der  Wissenschaftslehre. 

[5] 


series  has  never  a  limit  but  always  only  a  probable  limit.  The 
notion  is  that  positive  errors  will  cancel  negative  errors,  but  the 
law  that  states  the  equal  frequency  or  facility  of  occurrence  of 
positive  and  negative  errors  only  holds  when  an  infinite  number 
of  observations  is  obtained  and  this  is  equivalent  to  saying  that 
it  never  holds.  Again  the  chances  are  co  :1  according  to  the  post- 
ulate that  any  given  observation  has  an  error,  and  hence,  defini- 
tional ly,  every  observation  has  an  error,  which  the  true  value 
has  not.  Since  every  observation  has  an  error  attached,  whether 
the  number  taken  be  large  or  small,  the  compounded  result  is 
not  an  observation  but  an  universal  result,  i.  e.,  a  similar  set  of 
observations  would  give  rise  to  the  same  value  of  the  unknown 
quantity.  The  true  value  would  not  cease  to  be  a  computation 
and  become  an  observation  in  virtue  of  the  number  of  observa- 
tions passing  from  the  finite  to  the  infinite. 

If  it  is  the  view  of  the  empiricist  that  the  real  fact  is 
postulated  because  of  the  discrepancies  among  certain  observa- 
tions, this  is  because  he  would  avoid  the  sceptical  conclusion  that 
the  truth  is  the  last  perception  or  that  there  is  a  different  truth 
for  each  observer.  In  so  far  as  this  is  his  motive,  however,  he  is 
not  empiricist  but  rationalist;  his  postulate  answers  a  logical  de- 
mand. He  is  properly  empiricist  if  he  asserts  that  his  real  fact  is 
postulated  on  empirical  grounds,  i.  e.,  because  it  is  a  matter  of 
experience  that  errors  occur.  But  the  notion  of  error  is  only 
introduced  when  a  true  value  without  error  is  postulated.  If 
the  observations  had  no  probable  error  there  would  be  no  need 
of  the  postulate.  If  they  have  a  probable  error  then  a  true 
value  without  error  is  already  postulated.  Therefore,  a  real 
fact  is  postulated  because  a  real  fact  is  postulated.  If  the  real 
fact  be  postulated  in  answer  to  the  logical  demand  which  asserts 
that  a  series  of  discordant  results  cannot  be  simultaneously  true, 
then  the  real  fact  is  postulated  because  of  the  laio  of  contradiction. 
The  existence  of  the  fact  Jollows  from  the  law  of  contradiction. 
This  would  be  the  view  of  the  rationalist. 

The  postulate  takes  another  form  when  it  is  said  that  the 
real  fact  is  postulated  because  of  its  definition.  But  its  defini- 
tion is  equivalent  to  the  assertion  that  it  can  never  be  known. 
The  empiricist  says:  "/t  is  because  it  is.^^     The  theologian  as- 

[6] 


sei'ts:    '■'■It  is  because  it  can  never  he  known.^^     He  names  his  fact 
God  and  describes  his  postulate  as  his  supreme  act  of  faith. 

Such  an  absolute  is  the  natural  meeting  place  for  realism  and 
idealism  but  it  is  not  one  in  which  either  realist  or  idealist  is 
called  upon  to  rejoice.  The  ground  is  cleared  for  an  absolute 
scepticism.  Having  to  deal  with  an  unknowable  which  is  abso- 
lutely real  the  sceptic  can  argue  with  his  opponent  as  he  likes. 
'■'■  The  more  information  we  have  of  our  fact,"  we  may  suppose 
him  to  say,  ''the  more  real  does  it  become.  Of  the  absolute 
fact  we  have  no  information.  Therefore,  the  absolute  fact 
is  absolutely  unreal.  But  the  absolute  fact  was  postulated 
as  the  most  real  thing.  Therefore,  to  define  the  absolute 
fact  as  the  most  real  thing  is  to  imply  its  absolute  unreality." 
Or  otherwise:  "Nothing  is  both  a  and  non-a;  the  absolute  fact 
is  both  real  and  unreal  and  is  consequently  nothing."  Again: 
"  A.  thing  that  is  not  a  possible  object  of  consciousness  is  no 
thing.  The  absolute  fact  can  never  be  known  and  is  therefore 
nothing."  These  contradictions  which  seem  to  follow  definition- 
ally  are  not  the  only  weapons  of  the  sceptic.  As  an  induction 
from  experience,  the  realist  or  the  idealist  asserts  that  the  real 
fact  is  never  the  same  from  moment  to  moment.  The  real  fact 
is  postulated  with  the  admission  that  it  is  in  constant  flux. 
Again  the  observer  is  not  the  same  observer  from  moment  to 
moment.  There  are  as  many  real  facts  as  observers.  The  post- 
ulator  may  rightly  be  called  upon  to  explain  this. 

Fichte's  fundamental  postulate,  "I  am  because  lam,"  is 
akin  to  both  the  empiricist's  and  the  rationalist's  mode  of  asser- 
tion. In  form  it  is  the  empiricist's,  viz.,  "The  real  fact  is 
postulated  because  it  is  postulated."  In  content  it  is  in  the 
rationalist's  manner,  for  the  ego  as  pure  activity  is  no  thing  (a 
passive  something)  and  hence  can  never  be  object  of  knowledge. 
Hence,  "  it  is  because  it  can  never  be  known."  The  expression 
"  It  is  because  it  is,"  is  familiar  in  the  writings  of  those  philos- 
ophers immediately  following  Kant.  Thus  in  HegeP  "  the 
thing  is  and  it  is  only  because  it  is."  In  Fichte  the  "I"  is 
predicated  as  existent  because  it  is  existent  in  the  same  sense. 
The  purely  logical  law  "  A  is  A,"  does   not  hold  without  quali- 

1  Fbanomeuologie  des  Geistes,  Qoebhardt,  Bamberg  und  Wurtzburg,1807,  S.23 

[7] 


fications,  such  as,  in  the  same  place,  at  the  same  time,  under  the 
same  circumstances,  etc.,  etc.  **I  am  I  "  holds  without  qualifi- 
cation since  the  subject  in  question  is  the  absolute  subject.  Of 
the  first  we  say:  "  if  A  is,  A  is;"  of  the  second:  "  because  A  is, 
A  is."  The  use  of  "because  '  in  the  sense  of  the  present 
context  might  be  expected  since  the  real  fact  in  this  connection 
and  the  ''  I  "  in  Fichte  play  the  same  part  as  ''  thing  iu  itself." 
Each  is  predicated  absolutely  since  neither  has  any  ^^Erkennt- 
nissgrund.'^  The  "  A  is  ^  "  in  Fichte  finds  its  sufiBcient reason 
in  the  "I  am  I."  In  the  Fichtean  postulate,  form  and  content 
being  identical,  the  rationalistic  and  the  empirical  dilemma  is 
supposedly  transcended.  This  conclusion  is  the  corollary  which 
Schelling draws  and  clears  the  ground  for  his  "identity  system." 
This  manner  of  satisfying  the  demand  of  the  rationalist  and 
empiricist  at  once,  necessitates  the  assumption  of  an  ego  as 
pure  activity  which  at  the  same  time  is  no  thing  (nothing)  and 
this  zero  answers  the  same  demand  as  that  of  the  real  fact  of 
science  forever  beyond  the  reach  of  experiment. 

"  In  this  choice,  (we  might  imagine  Schelling  to  say),  in 
this  choice  as  to  how  the  "  thing  in  itself  "  shall  be  postulated, 
the  theologian  has  the  courage  to  stand  on  the  platform  of  his 
dilemma,  but  he  fears  to  call  his  God  what  the  concept  implies. 
He  clothes  his  concept  with  this  or  that  unessential  or  accidental 
feature  in  his  vain  attempt  to  supply  it  with  reality.  He  lacks 
the  courage  to  submerge  himself  in  the  real  world.  The  materi- 
alist has  the  courage  to  submerge  himself  in  his  world  but  he  is 
coward  when  asked  to  strip  his  world  of  its  reality — to  admit  its 
absolute  unreality." 

The  real  fact  is  qualitatively  the  same  as  any  individual 
observation  of  it:  That  is  to  say,  if  a  mass  be  observed  the  real 
mass  lies  beyond  observation  but  is  nevertheless  a  mass  of  some 
definite  amount.  It  is  an  instance  of  mass.  The  necessity  of 
postulating  it  in  this  manner  is  the  result  of  what  we  may  call 
the  necessity  of  perception.  It  is  the  necessity  which  assures  us 
that  we  are  not  observing  any  one  of  a  number  of  masses  but  a 
determinate  mass;  that  we  do  not  observe  a  length  in  general  but 
a  particular  instance  of  length. 

The  most  probable  value  of  an  unknown  observed  quantity 

[8] 


is  uot  itself  observed;  it  is  deduced  as  the  result  of  a  set  of  observa- 
tions. The  actual  value  of  the  unknown  (i.  e.,  the  limit  of  the 
probable  value  when  the  number  of  observations  is  increased 
without  limit)  cannot  then  be  an  observation  unless,  as  was  sug- 
gested before,  it  be  argued  that  it  ceases  to  be  a  deduction  and 
becomes  an  observation  in  virtue  of  the  number  of  observations 
taken  passiug  from  the  finite  to  the  infinite.  The  actual  value 
(the  real  fact)  is  a  general  or  universal  result,  i.  e.,  a  similar  set 
of  observations  would  lead  to  the  same  result.  Of  course  if  an  in- 
finite number  of  observations  were  taken  a  second  time  on  the 
unknown  quantity,  each  observation  of  the  first  set  would  suj)- 
posedly  occur  in  the  second  set  but  in  a  different  position  in  the 
series,  in  such  a  way,  however,  that  the  implied  result  of  each 
set  should  be  the  same  unknown  quantity.  The  real  fact  is  uot 
immediate  as  was  supposed  at  first  and  before  reflection;  its  truth 
appears  as  universal.  As  universal  its  necessity  is  the  kind  of 
necessity  that  folloios  on  definition. 

The  contradiction  at  hand  is  the  contradiction  of  definitional 
and  perceptive  necessity  and  the  presence  of  this  contradiction 
directs  our  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  original  postulate  has 
failed  to  meet  the  initial  need.  Our  difliculty  in  the  beginning 
was  due  to  the  experience  that  the  individual  members  of  a  series 
of  observations  are  not  the  same.  This  difficulty  was  supposedly 
removed  when  the  individual  discrepancies  were  attributed  to 
the  variable  state  of  the  observer  and  when  the  real  result  was 
postulated  as  independent  of  the  observer,  qualitatively  the  same 
as  the  perception  of  it,  but  always  quantitatively  different.  De- 
fined in  this  way,  however,  it  ceased  to  be  an  instance  of  the 
observed  quantity,  since  it  is  never  perceived,  and  became  mii- 
versal.  As  universal,  it  fails,  however,  to  meet  the  initial  need, 
which  was  for  a  stable  element  in  the  flux  of  perception.  The 
real  fact  must  then  remain  an  instance  of  the  quality  in  question 
but  an  instance  which  is  independent  of  the  perception  of  it,  a 
"  thing  in  itself."  As  such,  however,  its  definition  leads  to  the 
standing  contradiction. 

Besides  its  characteristic  of  being  unknowable  the  definition 
of  the  real  fact  implies  as  well  that  it  is  a  limit  which  may  be 
approached  as  near  as  one  may  wish  but  never  attained.     Viewed 


in  this  manner  it  is  in  the  nature  of  an  ideal.  Its  reality  is  the 
kind  of  reality  that  attaches  to  any  other  concept  and  is  not  a 
reality  that  subsists  somehow  independently  of  the  subject. 
Like  the  "  I  am  I"  of  Fichte,  the  subject  postulates  it  and  this 
is  its  sole  ground  of  existence. 

In  its  lirst  form  as  a  reality  lying  beyond  its  manifestations 
in  experience  and  as  the  objective  cause  of  perception  it  is  the 
cause  of  appearances  and  hence  comes  to  be  identified  with  force 
(Kraft).  As  the  "inner  truth"  it  is  implied  by  its  appear- 
ances, for  it  is  only  postulated  because  of  these.  (In  the  language 
of  Hegel)  "The  expression  of  the  force  implies  the  force  proper." 
But  also  in  the  opposite  sense,  as  the  cause  of  its  manifestations, 
it  implies  these.  Now  the  force  proper  has  appeared  as  an  ideal, 
or  it  is  conceptual  in  its  nature,  and  the  only  way  in  which  a 
concept  can  be  the  cause  of  anything  in  this  connection  is  in  the 
sense  that  its  effects  follow  as  the  necessary  implications  of  its 
definition.  (In  the  language  of  Hegel)  "The  force  proper  im- 
plies its  expression  and  follows  upon  the  realization  of  its 
expression." 

The  use  of  the  term  "force"  (Kraft)  in  this  connection  is 
intelligible  when  the  habit  of  thought  familiar  in  Fichte  and 
Schelling  is  recalled.  "She  (the  soul)  does  not  intuite  herself 
without  exhibiting  herself  in  an  object.  She  will  thus  intuite 
herself  as  an  object  in  which  there  is  productive  force. "^  Of 
course  the  standpoint  is  the  idealism  that  represents  the  world 
as  the  product  of  the  self.  "  Since  there  is  in  the  mind  an  un- 
ending striving  to  organize  itself,  so  too  in  the  outer  world,  an 
universal  tendency  to  organization  must  reveal  itself."'^  And 
again:  "  No  organization  is  thinkable  without  productive  force. 
I  should  like  to  know  how  such  a  force  would  come  into  matter, 
if  we  regard  matter  as  a  thing  in  itself.  *  *  *  Theris  is  a 
productive  force  in  things  outside  us.  Such  a  force  is  only  the 
force  of  a  mind;  thus  those  things  cannot  be  things  in  them- 
selves—i.  e.,  cannot  possess  reality  through  themselves.  They 
can  only  be  the  creations,  the  products  of  a  mind."^ 

1  Schelling,  Werke,  Abth.  I,  Bd.  I,  S.  385-386,  Erlauterung    des    Idealismus 
der  Wissenschaftslehre. 

2  ibid,  B.  386. 

3  Ibid,  S.  387. 

[10] 


"  Force  "  appears  then  as  an  active  principle  in  the  sensible 
world  and  its  activity  is  the  necessity  of  definitional  implication. 
In  this  sense  it  is  the  free  self-active  legislator  for  appearances 
and  as  the  ''inner"  or  "beyond"  the  perceived  world  it 
appears  as  a  kingdom  of  laws,  the  true  image  of  reality.  This 
kingdom  of  laws  as  the  laws  of  definition  and  hence  as  creations 
of  the  self,  is  seen  to  be  nothing  but  the  realm  of  the  self's 
activity.  When  these  laws  have  been  formulated  the  self's 
activity  is  realized,  the  curtain  is  raised  on  the  "  beyond  ''  and 
the  self -consciousness  appears. 

Nevertheless,  it  is  patent  that  any  instance  of  change  in  the 
world  of  perception  is  not  implied  by  the  law  of  change  itself, 
for  even  if  all  the  laws  of  the  universe  were  formulated,  an  initial 
situation  would  have  to  be  known  before  all  past  and  future 
situations  could  be  predicted  definitionally.  A  physicist  (as 
Laplace)  might  say:  ''Give  me  the  mass,  velocity  and  position 
of  all  the  matter  in  the  universe  and  I  will  predict  any  future 
situation."  But  without  such  data  his  completed  description  of 
the  world  is  an  empty  form  and  m  itself  helpless  without  this 
alien  assistance.  The  real  fact,  defintd  as  beyond  the  reach  of 
observation,  was  introduced  at  first  as  a  "force"  which  would 
account  for  an  initial  situation.  Since  it  lies  beyond  experience 
it  is  an  ideal  and  is  then  recognized  as  the  contribution  of  the 
describer.  Through  the  experience  of  this  transformation  the 
self-consciousness  makes  its  appearance,  but  the  gap  between  the 
law  as  universal  and  its  individual  illustration  is  not  bridged. 

By  the  real  fact  as  initially  postulated  one  was  far  from 
meaning  the  self's  activity  or  even  a  product  due  entirely  to 
self's  activity.  The  need  to  be  met  was  that  of  an  objective 
stimulus  which  should  somehow  remain  stable  in  the  flux 
of  sense  perception.  If  the  truth  be  merely  the  last  percep- 
tion, a  thoroughgoing  scepticism  results.  Eegarded  as  inde- 
pendent of  the  self,  the  real  fact  appears  as  a  "thing  in  itself," 
(i.  e.,  as  no  thing),  and  it  comes  then  to  be  regarded  as  the 
constant  or  invariable  character  that  attaches  to  change  among 
things  or  as  the  law  of  change.^     In  this  guise,  however,  it  fails 

1  Cf.  Hegel's  words:     Die  Kraft  ist  gerade  so  beschajfen,  wie  das  Oesetz 
(opp.  cit.  S.  S5). 

[11] 


to  meet  tbc  original  need.  The  need  was  not  for  an  invariable 
formula  of  change,  but  for  a  term  that  should  remain  invariable 
in  such  a  formula.  The  initial  motive  is  still  unsatisfied  if  the 
real  fact  in  its  role  of  law  fails  to  meet  the  initial  need.  That  it 
does  fail  in  this  is  patent  if  the  law  carries  no  criterion  of  the 
terms  that  enter  into  it,  if  it  furnishes  no  test  of  its  own  appli- 
cation; for  then  we  have  two  independent  constants — the  law 
itself  and  the  terms  that  enter  into  it. 

The  alternative  is  to  regard  the  law  as  the  definition  of  the 
term.  The  real  fact  is  that  which  behaves  in  the  way  prescribed. 
Thus  mass  is  that  fact  which  exactly  satifies  the  formula  of  the 
law  of  gravitation.  Of  course  this  fact  cannot  be  independent 
of  the  self,  and  Schelling  has  been  quoted  above  as  saying  that 
"  the  force  in  nature  is  nothing  but  the  force  of  the  mind."  It 
is  of  course  evident  that  the  contrast  of  the  law  as  essence  and 
its  individual  realization  or  instance  is  not  thus  transcended. 
The  requirements  of  an  initial  situation  or  instance  is  furnished 
for  Fichte  by  the  so-called  intellectual  intuition,  the  intuition 
of  the  self  as  pure  activity,  in  which  the  self  is  seen  to  exist 
through  the  mere  act  of  predication.  The  problem  which  the 
idealism  of  Fichte  does  not  seem  to  explain  naturally  is  this: 
If  the  real  fact  is  the  ego,  or  the  ego's  activity,  how  is  the  multi- 
plicity of  egos  to  be  explained  and  how  is  the  conclusion  to  be 
escaped  that  there  are  as  many  systems  of  truth  as  there  are 
egos?  The  answer  to  the  first  question  might  be  that  the  num- 
ber of  real  facts  is  no  difficulty  so  soon  as  one  is  at  hand,  or  as 
soon  as  a  starting  point  is  attained. 

For  Hegel  the  absolute  is  not  reached  on  the  attainment  of 
the  pure  self  consciousness,  this  representing  but  a  station  in  the 
^progress  to  the  final  goal. 

[12] 


Before  taking  up  an  investigation  of  nature,  the  critical 
philosopher  is  inclined  to  make  a  preliminary  survey  of  himself 
and  his  faculties,  as  the  subjective  medium  through  which  truth 
is  given;  to  see  how  far  his  knowledge  is  dependent  on  this 
medium— in  short,  to  inquire  of  the  true  essence  of  the  subjec- 
tive and  the  objective.  The  mechanism  of  mind,  whose  func- 
tion it  is  to  deliver  finished  truths  to  the  subject,  must  be 
approached  for  its  own  sake,  and  a  natuial  dialectic  is  hence 
confronted  with  the  problem  of  how  this  approach  is  to  be 
instigated. 

The  field  of  choice  indeed  appears  to  be  open  enough,  but 
through  previous  acquaintance  with  the  problems  of  mind,  it  is 
ventured  that  on  first  reflection  "the  objective"  appears  as  that 
part  which  is  independent  of  this  medium,  and  hence  the  "real" 
element  as  over  against  the  "accidental."  The  "real"  received 
through  the  medium  undergoes  a  change,  a  formation;  it  receives 
the  imprint  of  the  medium.  When  external  reality  (the  "real" 
hypothesized)  is  fed  into  the  mechanism  of  mind,  the  re^sultant 
product  ceases  to  be  real.  It  becomes  the  "accidental,"  for  it  is 
known,  not  as  it  is,  but  as  it  appears  in  the  medium.^ 

It  would  seem  that  should  we  discover  the  behavior  of  the 
mechanism — the  laws  of  its  action — the  "real"  would  be  dis- 
tinguished from  the  "accidental"  as  well  as  the  true  from  the 
false.  Should  we  attempt  to  remove  the  "accidental"  and  so 
obtain  the  "real"  in  its  pure  state,  we  require  a  test  that  will 
distinguish  the  subjective  from  the  objective;  but  this  touchstone 
would  in  no  way  help  us,  for  all  appears  only  through  the 
medium.  A  formula  describing  how  our  knowledge  is  affected 
in  the  medium  is  not  then  what  we  require.  We  require  to  know 
"not  the  law  of  refraction  of  the  lays  in  the  medium,  but  the 
rays  themselves." 

As  a  result  of  this  first  engagement  with  its  natural  exper- 
ience, dialectic  retreats,  proceeds  to  examine  her  presuppositions, 
and  discovers  that  various  distinctions  have  been  assumed.  A 
medium  and  something  separately  existing  for  itself    (the  hy- 

[13] 


pothesized  "real"),  and  the  distinction  between  a  self  audits 
information,  are  the  antitheses  which  separate  out.  If  the  absolute 
be  viewed  as  "beyond"  the  province  of  experience  and  as  a 
something  to  which  knowledge  cannot  attain,  it  is  customary  to 
say  that  the  subject  is  foredoomed  to  know  only  an  aspect  of 
truth,  the  phenomenal  reflection  of  the  "real."  But  now  the 
absolute  "real"  and  the  knowledge  the  subject  possesses  come 
into  stronger  antithesis.  The  chasm  is  not  bridged  but  only 
deepened.  This  characteristic  assumption  that  the  absolute  is 
the  only  "  real,"  effectually  blocks  a  solution.  To  suppose  that 
we  already  possess  a  meaning  for  such  categories  as  these,  is  to 
suppose  our  first  task  already  accomplished;  indeed  to  attach  a 
complete  meaning  to  them  is  the  task  itself. 

The  exposition  as  just  given  is  not  itself  the  knowledge 
which  dialectic  seeks.  It  is  rather  to  be  viewed  as  a  sample  of 
the  history  of  natural  dialectic — as  the  viewing  of  inner  exper- 
ience in  its  successive  manifestations.  It  does  not  represent 
truth  itself  but  a  process  of  which  truth  is  the  final  term.  The 
ways  of  philosophizing  are  many.  The  systems,  in  which  great 
thought  has  been  given  classical  form,  are  not  to  be  regarded  as 
ways  of  exhibiting  the  same  truths  with  greater  or  less  success, 
but  rather  as  a  continuous  dialectic  development,  which  consti- 
tutes the  growth  of  metaphysical  experience.'-  The  process  must 
be  followed  to  the  final  term.  Forewarned  that  the  successive 
shapes,  into  which  this  experience  is  cast,  are  not  the  goal,  con- 
sciousness views  the  process  as  the  road  of  appearances;  the 
shapes  at  hand  present  but  phenomenal  knowledge.  The  task 
which  the  science  of  mind  prescribes  for  itself  is  to  transcend 
these  its  accidents.  Each  succeeding  point  of  view,  as  the  child 
of  the  preceding,  is  committed  to  the  death  of  its  parent.  Viewed 
in  this  light  the  task  of  metaphysic  postulates  a  faith  in  its 
outcome. 

Viewed  for  itself  and  not  for  its  result,  the  natural  dialectic 
may  be  regarded  as  the  road  of  scepticism.^  Not  indeed  a  Carte- 
sian scepticism,  in  which,  when  the  doubt  has  been  removed, 
the  original  opinion  remains  as  it  was  before,  but  a  scepticism 
whose  outcome  is  quite  the  antithesis  of  the  opinion  which  gave 
birth  to  it.     It  is  the  postulate  of  the  untruth  of  the  phenomenal 

[14] 


knowledge  with  which  it  is  committed  to  deal.  It  is  the  postu- 
late that  the  self  must  follow  its  own  conviction,  or  rather 
construct  its  own  opinion — that  in  fact  the  truth  can  only  be  the 
final  product  of  the  self.* 

The  life  of  natural  dialectic  is  in  conformity  to  law  and  its 
progress  unavoidable.*  The  context  and  interconnection  of  its 
phenomena — points  of  view — on  this  road  of  appearances,  are 
the  guarantee  of  its  completeness.  Since  each  point  of  view  is 
the  parent  of  the  succeeding  one,  the  omission  of  any  term  is  the 
death  of  the  sequence.  Indeed  the  opposite  view  is  one  of  the 
natural  phenomena  of  the  road.  Appearances  are  the  demons 
the  natural  dialectic  must  overcome,  before  mind  is  landed  in 
the  heaven  of  truth. 

On  this  view  the  thinking  self,  as  distinguished  from  the 
phenomenal  self,  is  perceived  as  former,  classifier  and  legislator 
in  the  world  of  appearances.  The  self's  thought  is  reality,  and 
this  is  the  standpoint  of  idealism.  The  idealism  which  assumes 
this  position  for  its  starting  point,  but  which  has  not  trodden 
the  path  that  leads  to  it,  has  not  grasped  the  significance  of  its 
stand,  for  the  demons  of  the  road  are  yet  to  be  slain.  Its  cer- 
tainty is  immediate,  but  it  stands  by  the  side  of  other  certain- 
ties which  are  equally  immediate,  which  in  truth  may  be  pred- 
icated with  equal  assurance.  These  alien  certainties  are  for 
me,  but  in  their  presence  I  admit  that  something  other  than  I  is 
for  me  object  and  certainty.  The  truth  of  idealism  possesses 
neither  validity  nor  meaning  when  presented  bald  of  the  context 
of  its  deduction. 

A  difficulty,  which  appears  to  confront  the  method  of  dia- 
lectic, is  the  initial  lack  of  a  criterion  of  its  procedure,  whether 
this  criterion  be  the  touchstone  of  the  content  of  metaphysic 
or  the  test  of  its  starting  point.  If  such  a  touchstone  were  at 
hand  it  would  represent  the  essence  of  the  process  itself,  and 
hence  would  be  expected  rather  in  the  outcome.  How  now  can  the 
outcome  furnish  any  assurance  of  the  necessity  of  the  process? 
Metaphysic  viewed  as  the  task  of  searching  for  and  testing  the 
reality  of  knowledge,  would  be  expected  to  find  its  criterion  of 
truth  within  itself.  This  test  as  the  essence  "in  itself"  is  our 
pbject,  or  it  is  "for  us"  and  its  truth  is  rather  the  knowledge 

[15] 


that  we  have  of  it.  These  two  poles,  concept  and  object,  as  ''in 
itself"  and  "for  another,"  fall  within  the  knowledge  which  is 
the  domain  of  our  investigation. 

It  is  not,  however,  enough  that  the  touchstone  be  at  hand  in 
consciousness;  dialectic  must  be  a  contributor  as  well  as  an 
observer.  Consciousness  is  not  only  consciousness  of  an  object, 
but  consciousness  of  itself.  The  object  is  only  for  consciousness 
in  the  manner  in  which  it  is  known.  If,  however,  the  object 
does  not  correspond  to  the  concept,  it  would  seem  that  con- 
sciousness must  alter  the  concept.  Now,  by  this  act  the  object 
is  altered,  for  the  knowledge  in  question  was  essentially  knowl- 
edge of  the  object.  The  object  is  only  "in  itself"  in  the  manner 
that  it  is  "for  us."  The  truth  or  essence  of  the  process  of 
natural  dialectic  appears  then,  first  as  that  which  it  is  "in 
itself."  But  in  so  far  as  it  is  the  end  of  our  search  it  is  our 
object,  or  it  is  "for  us,"  i.  e.,  the  antithesis,  which  is  essential 
to  our  understanding  of  the  "in  itself"  destroys  the  character- 
istic feature  of  the  latter  term. 

The  modification  of  the  point  of  view,  through  the  process 
of  dialectic  is  experience.  The  truth  ot  experience  is  the  out- 
come or  the  final  view- point.  The  history  of  the  process  is 
itself  the  science  of  mind. 

II. 

We  recognize  two  classes  of  information — the  knowledge 
of  universals,  and  that  furnished  by  the  senses;  the  essence  of 
athing  as  over  against  its  "being"  or  individuality.  Of  the 
latter  we  appear  to  be  merely  receptive;  we  say  the  information 
is  given. 

These  "data"  unreflectively  considered  appear  as  our  rich- 
est knowledge,  for  their  domain,  space  and  time,  is  boundless, 
whether  by  addition  or  by  subdivision  of  parts.  It  gives  illus- 
tration to  the  most  rigorous  science,  mathematics.  Thus  it 
appears  to  give  rise  as  well  to  our  truest  knowledge. 

On  reflection,  however,  the  information  that  these  "data" 
furnish  turns  out  to  be  the  poorest  and  most  abstract.  It  says 
nothing  of  the  object,  except  "it  is."^  It  predicates  only  exist- 
ence.    The  function  of  the  object,  its  relation  to  other  objects, 


the  way  we  come  to  know  it,  in  short  its  behavior  in  the  context 
of  experience,  is  not  given  in  sense  ''data."  This  is  to  say  that 
we  are  given  no  account  of  the  meaning  or  significance  of  the 
experience.  It  is  what  remains  when  all  differences  are 
abstracted. 

Dialectic,  at  this  its  starting  point,  has  spun  as  yet  no  web 
of  meaning  for  the  term  consciousness.  Consciousness  is  certain 
of  its  ''datum,"  but  not  because  it  is  a  manifold  and  complex 
something,  which  furnishes  its  own  contribution  to  the  "datum;" 
nor  because  the  "datum"  is  a  manifold  rich  in  relationships, 
within  itself,  to  consciousness,  and  to  experience.  "It  is." 
This  is  the  bald  information  ol  the  certainty  of  sense.  Con- 
sciousness is  simple  "I,"  the  subject  of  the  proposition:  I  am 
certain.  I  am  thiSy  which  is  certain,  and  the  "datum"  is  that  of 
which  I  am  certain.  Thus  does  the  first  difference  or  distinction 
appear. 

The  "datum,"  besides  being  the  most  abstract  of  abstrac- 
tions, is  also  an  individual;  it  is  immediate.  It  is  this  last  how- 
ever only  with  reference  to  a  knoioer,  and  the  knower  is  such 
only  with  reference  to  a  thing  Jcnoivn.^  I  am  certain  on  account 
of  the  "datum;"  the  "datum"  furnishes  the  certainty  tome. 
Thus  knower  and  thing  known  0)ily  have  significance  with 
reference  to  one  another.  Neither  has  a  meaning  without  this 
reciprocal  reference,  and  hence  each  ceases  to  be  immediate  and 
becomes  mediate.  The  object  is  the  essential;  it  may  exist 
whether  it  be  known  or  not.  Or  the  knower  is  the  essential; 
the  information  may  remain  after  the  object  ceases  to  exist. 
That  is  to  say,  the  essential  pole  of  this  reciprocal  relation  is 
determined  by  the  view-point. 

Now  the  "datum"  is  only  characterized  as  immediate  in 
the  sense  that  it  is  an  instance  of  immediateness.  In  other 
places  and  at  other  times  are  other  ''data,"  which  are  with 
equal  justice  characterized  by  this  very  predicate  of  immediate- 
ness. Immediateness  is  not  a  feature  of  that  object  yonder  that 
applies  uniquely.  The  extension  of  the  class  of  things  immediate 
is  unlimited,  for  every  individual  possesses  this  feature.  The 
essence  of  the  individual  is  hence  an  universal.'    These  distinc- 

[17] 


tions— the  first  of  the  /  and  the  '^  datum,^^  and  the  second  of  the 
essence  and  theinstance — are  not  furnished  by  me,  but  are  rather 
the  discoveries  of  the  dialectic. 

We  are  not  helped  if  we  attempt  to  come  upon  the  singu- 
larity of  the  individual  by  means  of  a  system  of  codrdinates  in 
space  and  time.^  If  we  refer  our  object  to  any  system  of  coordi- 
nates in  space,  the  space  origin  is  a  new  individual  which  is 
either  assumed  arbitrarily  or  is  referred  to  a  new  origin  which 
in  turn  is  arbitrarily  assumed.  If  a  date  be  attached  to  the 
occurrence  of  the  object,  the  time  origin  is  the  new  individual 
which  is  in  question. 

On  this  view  the  object  is  characterized  as  the  "  here"  and 
the  ^'  now."  "  To  the  question:  what  is  the  '  now  '?  we  answer 
for  example:  the  'now'  is  the  night."  The  answer  however 
cannot  be  a  truth  unless  it  remain  invariable,  and  this  it  does 
not.  The  "■  now  "  is  twelve  o'clock;  while  I  speak  the  truth  of 
the  statement  vanishes.  Of  the  ''here"  I  say:  the  "here"  is 
a  tree.  I  turn,  and  the  "  here  "  is  no  longer  a  tree  but  a  house. 
Thus  the  "here"  and  the  "now"  are  strictly  universals,  for 
they  are  predicated  of  any  one  of  a  number  of  objects. 

If  then  the  certainty  of  sense  be  the  universal,  the  object  is 
no  longer  the  essential,  but  rather  the  knowledge  which  the 
subject  has  of  the  object.  The  truth  is  to  be  sought  in  the  im- 
mediateness  of  my  sense  perceptions.  I  assert  that  the  "  here  " 
is  a  tree  because  I  see  the  tree.  Another  subject  however  asserts 
that  the  "here"  is  a  house.  Both  assertions  have  the  same 
justification,  viz.,  the  immediateness  of  sense  perception.  What 
subsists  is  the  / — the  /  as  universal — a  perceiving,  which  is  a 
perceiving,  whether  it  be  that  of  a  tree  or  that  of  a  house. 

"  I  mean,  to  be  sure,  an  individual  subject,  but  I  can  say  as 
little  of  this  individual  subject  as  I  can  say  of  the  '  here '  and 
the  '  now.'  In  so  far  as  I  say  this  '  Aere,'  '  noio '  or  an  individual, 
I  say  every  this,  every  ^  here,^  '■  now,^  individual.  Just  so  when 
I  say:  /,  this  individual  7,  I  say:  every  I.  Each  one  is  what  I 
say;  7,  this,  individual  7."^ 

What  then  are  we  to  answer  to  the  question:  what  is  the 
"  that  yonder  %  "  The  answer  if  it  be  a  truth  must  be  lasting. 
It  must  represent  a  feature  of  that  individual  thing  which  is 

[18] 


invarient.  It  must  be  a  feature  of  which  that  individual  thing 
yonder  is  an  illustration.  We  require  to  put  the  object  in  a 
class  by  itself;  to  name  a  property  which  applies  to  it  and  can 
apply  to  no  other  thing.  No  such  class  is  thinkable  except  a 
null  class;  the  only  solution  to  the  condition  hypothesized  is  zero. 
This  solution,  while  unique,  applies  however  to  every  illustra- 
tion of  the  "  that  yonder."  But  that  which  can  be  predicated  of 
every  individual  we  call  an  universal.  The  universal  then 
turns  out  to  be  the  stable  element  of  the  certainty  of  sense. 

Should  it  be  said  that  the  uniqueness  of  the  "that  yonder  " 
consists  in  its  relation  to  the  rest  of  experience  —that  its  particu- 
lar context  can  never  be  repeated  in  exact  detail — one  can  reply 
that  no  account  of  this  context  can  be  given  without  reference 
to  general  terms;  in  vain  is  it  to  be  distinguished  from  an  infinite 
number  of  possible  experiences.  Is  the  individual  immediate 
from  one  point  of  view,  it  is  mediate  from  another.  Predicate 
its  essence  to  be  pure  being  and  it  disappears.  Give  it  any 
positive  quality  and  it  will  from  another  point  of  view  exhibit 
the  opposite  quality.  In  truth  it  behaves  strictly  as  a  zero 
ought  to  behave.  Defined  in  antithesis  to  the  universal  it 
becomes  itself  an  universal;  in  fact,  "  the  individual  is  the  most 
universal  thing  there  is,  for  everything  is  an  individual. "^° 

III." 

The  truth  of  the  certainty  of  sense  has  proven  to  be  the  uni- 
versal. In  the  origination  of  this  principle  two  factors  separated 
out— the  mental  act  of  reception  (perception)  and  the  object. 
The  two  are  in  essence  the  same— their  principle  is  the  universal; 
the  one  is  a  separation  of  the  elements  (perception)  and  the 
other  their  combination  (the  object).  Since  it  is  the  function  of 
perception  to  be  aware  of  the  separate  qualities  as  determinate 
and  mutually  exclusive,  its  essence  consists  in  negation,  determ- 
inateness  or  manifoldness.  The  perception  differs  from  the 
immediateness  of  the  supposed  individual,  for  it  exhibits  itself 
as  property  or  as  universal.  The  properties  in  so  far  as  they  are 
determinate  have  a  negative  character  attached  to  them,  i.  e., 
they  are  exclusive. 

[19] 


i 


The  universal  as  the  truth  is  the  essential;  the  perception 
and  the  object  the  unessential.  However  in  so  far  as  the  latter 
are  the  things  described  through  the  universal,  both  are  essential. 
Viewed  in  their  reciprocal  relationship  the  one  must  be  essential 
and  the  other  unessential. 

The  object  as  that  which  exists  for  itself,  whether  perceived 
or  not,  must  be  further  examined.  On  the  view  that  the  object 
possesses  a  self-subsistence  apart  from  the  perception  of  it,  and 
granted  that  its  truth  is  in  the  nature  of  an  universal,  this  same 
object  exhibits  itself  as  the  thing  of  complex  attributes.^ 

The  existence  of  a  property  is  mediate  in  that  it  expresses 
its  immediateness  as  its  characteristic.  It  is  mediate  again  in 
that  it  predicates  itself  as  the  negation  of  other  simultaneously 
existing  attributes.  The  several  properties  are  differentiated, 
the  one  from  the  other,  and  are  thus  not  only  universaLs  but 
instances  of  universality  as  well.  The  simple  universal  is  rather 
the  medium,  in  which  the  several  properties  subsist  and  of  which 
they  are  the  expressions — each  and  every  property  partakes  of 
universality. 

The  properties  of  a  thing  exist  together  without  disturbing 
one  another.  This  characteristic  constitutes  the  oneness  of  the 
thing.  It  abstracts  from  the  differences  and  is  a  simple  universal 
or  the  medium  in  which  the  properties  subsist.  This  unity  is 
nothing  more  than  the  "here  "  and  the  "  now."  The  properties 
subsist  together  and  simultaneously.  This  salt  is  white,  it  is  also 
sharp,  also  heavy,  also  cubical  in  form.  This  indifferent  "  also  " 
is  the  simple  universal,  the  medium,  the  unity  of  the  thing, 
which  binds  the  properties  together.  This  togetherness  of  a 
complex  of  properties,  this  indifference  which  they  entertain 
toward  one  another,  is  characteristic  of  the  object  and  constitutes 
its  essence. 

The  members  of  a  complex  of  properties  have  not  however 
alone  the  purely  negative  feature  of  indifference  to  one  another— 
they  have  as  w611  a  positive  feature.  If  they  are  to  differentiate 
themselves  they  must  be  determinate.  They  must  deny  their 
opposites  as  well  as  their  indifferents.  Thus  in  this  sense  they 
cannot  subsist  in  the  same  medium.  In  this  suit  then  to  estab- 
lish  the  object  as  the  truth  of  perception,  reflection  has  won  tliQ, 

[20] 


case  for  his  client  perception.  The  object  is  defeated  on  his 
own  premises.  It  is  asserted  that  the  essence  of  the  object  is 
the  indifference  of  the  several  qualities  or  their  self-subsistence, 
and  the  pragmatic  result  which  reflection  briugs  out  is  the  dis- 
appearance of  the  qualities,  for  these  cannot  be  described  save 
as  mutually  exclusive. 

The  negative  character  of  the  several  properties — their  in- 
difference to  one  another,  and  the  positive  side — their  opposition, 
exhibit  two  aspects  of  the  medium:, it  is  unitary;  it  is  as  well  an 
''also."  The  discussion  of  the  object  as  the  truth  of  perception 
is  then  for  the  present  complete.  It  is:  (1)  passive  universality, 
indifference,  the  "also;"  (2)  the  universal  of  opposition,  the 
determinate,  the  one;  and  (3)  the  properties  themselves,  the' 
relation  of  the  first  two  aspects  to  one  another. 

The  truth  of  the  object  in  whatever  aspect  it  may  present 
itself,  is  the  universal.  All  the  properties  as  universals  and  the 
simple  universal  as  the  medium  in  which  they  subsist,  are  as 
such  the  possession  of  the  subject.  The  subject,  however,  has 
as  yet  no  assurance  that  this  medium  is  invariant  and  hence 
no  assurance  that  the  manner  in  which  its  truth  is  given 
is  always  the  same.  If  the  subject  furnishes  any  contribution 
to  the  datum,  then  the  truth  of  the  datum  is  changed.  On  the 
supposition  that  the  object  is  the  true,  the  universal,  the  essen- 
tial, the  self  subsistent,  while  consciousness  is  the  unessential 
and  the  changeable,  it  can  happen  that  the  object  is  not  rightly 
perceived.  It  is  through  the  experience  of  this  argument  that 
the  perceiver  first  becomes  conscious  of  the  possibility  oi  deception. 

The  object  as  the  truth  of  perception  is  the  essential,  the 
perceiver  the  unessential.  If  the  perception  is  incorrect  it  is 
the  fault  of  the  perceiver.  The  object,  viewed  in  the  medium, 
which  is  the  universal,  receives  the  stamp  of  the  medium. 
Since  the  object  is  the  self-subsistent  and  the  true,  the  untruth 
arises  in  the  perceiver.  Assume  that  the  truth  of  the  object, 
which  I  perceive,  is  its  unity,  its  individuality.  I  perceive  the 
several  properties  as  indifferent  to,  and  as  not  affecting  one 
another.  Eeflection  distinguishes  the  properties  as  universals 
and  as  exclusive,  i.  e.,  it  is  not  perceived  in  the  medium  in  its 
true  aspect.  Keflection  tells  us  that  a  determinate  property 
excludes  its  opposites  and  its  indifferentsj  the  self-subsistence, 

[21] 


the  indifference  of  the  several  properties  of  the  object  constitute 
its  individuality.  As  universals  the  proj)erties  are  determinate, 
opposed  to  one  another,  excluding  one  another,  i.  e.,  I  do  not 
perceive  the  object  correctly;  reflection  destroys  the  continuity 
of  the  object. 

As  a  result  of  this  dialectic  circle,  consciousness  is  landed 
on  a  higher  level.  As  a  result  of  these  distinctions  the  ex- 
perience is  gained  that  the  truth  of  the  perception  and  thing  per- 
ceived is  to  be  sought  in  reflectLQii.  ^^  Consciousness  corrects  the 
former  impression;  it  distinguishes  truth  conceptually  attained 
from  the  untruth  of  perception.  It  is  aware  of  refiectiou  within 
itself  as  distinguished  from  simple  perception.  We  are  aware 
that  the  truth  as  well  as  the  untruth  of  the  object  lies  in  con- 
sciousness. To  be  warned  of  the  untruth  of  perception  is  to  be 
armed  against  the  possibility  of  being  deceived.  Thus  when  the 
contradiction  of  unity  and  multiplicity  arises  we  recognize  it  as 
a  distinction  of  thought. 

If  then  the  object  is  one,  if  its  contradictory  aspect — the 
mutually  exclusive  character  of  its  attributes — arises  in  me,  it 
is  the  subject  which  is  responsible  for  the  destruction  of  the 
self-subsistence  of  the  object.  Properties  are  assigned  to  the 
object  depending  on  the  sense  organ  affected.  The  salt  is  white 
because  brought  before  the  eye;  it  is  sharj)  when  pressed  on  the 
tongue;  cubical  to  the  sense  of  sight  and  of  touch,  and  so  on. 
Tlie  subject  contributes  the  latter  result  and  distinguishes  the 
properties  from  one  another.  The  subject  is  the  medium  in 
which  the  properties  subsist,  and  the  truth  of  perception  is  to 
be  sought  in  the  subject.  The  latter  has  however  but  brief 
space  in  which  to  congratulate  itself.  The  dialectic  proceeds  as 
before.  It  is  characteristic  of  the  several  properties  on  account 
of  their  determinateness  and  mutual  exclusiveness  to  destroy  the 
unity  and  continuity  of  the  object.  The  essence  or  truth  of  the 
object  is  then  its  unity,  its  continuity,  i.  e.,  a  universal  medium 
in  which  the  properties  subsist  together. 

Thus  the  circle  is  complete  and  we  are  returned  to  the 
starting  point.  The  object  is  one  onjj  as  opposed  to  other 
objects.  But  its  unity  does  not  distinguish  it  from  other  objects, 
but  the  determinateness  of  its  properties — it  is  the  same  as  any 

[22] 


other  object  witli  respect  to  its  oneness.  It  has  properties  which 
distinguish  it  from  other  objects.  In  truth  it  is  the  object  which 
is  white  and  cubical,  heavy  and  sharp;  or  the  object  is  the 
''  also,"  the  universal  medium,  and  so  conceived  it  is  conceived 
in  its  reality. 

The  object  is  one;  it  is  "for  itself,"  but  it  is  no  less  for  the 
perceiver,  just  as  otherwise  the  perceiver  is  "for  it."  Thus 
the  essential  of  the  object  is  doubled;  it  is  the  object  which  this 
time  oifers  us  the  contradiction.  The  determinateuess  of  the 
object  which  is  the  essential  on  the  one  side,  is  that  which  dis- 
tinguishes it  from  other  objects.  But  that  which  distinguishes 
it  from  other  objects  puts  it  into  relation  to  these,  and  that  is 
to  destroy  its  self-subsistvence,  which  is  its  essential  feature. 
The  object  predicated  as  "for  itself"  or  as  absolute  negation 
of  otherness,  falls  because  of  its  essential  characteristic.  Nega- 
tion of  otherness  is  at  the  same  time  negation  of  self. 

The  fate  of  the  object  as  the  truth  of  perception  is  then 
identical  with  that  of  the  supposed  certainty  of  sense.  The  latter 
proved  itself  an  universal.  Viewed  in  the  light  of  its  origin, 
however,  it  is  essentially  conditioned  by  the  sensuous.  The 
universal,  as  the  outcome,  is  essentially  dependent  ou  the  start- 
ing point;  the  final  term  as  the  child  of  the  initial  term,  bears 
the  birth-mark  of  its  origin.  On  the  view  that  this  antithesis 
be  somehow  necessarily  dissoluble  into  a  unity,  consciousness 
stands  in  the  presence  of  the  absolute  universal,  and  has  for  the 
first  time  truly  entered  the  kingdom  of  the  understanding. 

The  conviction  that  the  individual  of  sense  is  the  immediate 
certainty  has  been  displaced  for  the  conviction  that  this  certainty 
is  the  universal,  but  this  universal  because  of  the  way  in  which 
it  has  arisen  remains  the  itm'yersaZ  of  sense.  The  "thing"  of 
perception  is  in  like  manner  no  less  "for  itself"  than  "for 
another." 

These  sophistries,  the  "also,"  the  "in  so  far  as,"  the  "es- 
sential" and  the  "unessential"  as  well  as  the  different  "points  of 
view, ' '  are  the  subterfuges  of  this  lower  consciousness  in  the 
role  of  the  immediate  certainty  and  of  perception.  They  are 
the  weapons  of  the  so-called  "sound  common  sense"  ou  account 

[23] 


of  which  philosophy  is  so  often  accused  of  having  to  do  only  with 
'  'things  of  thought. "  In  this  fashon  is  this  mode  of  consciousness 
accustomed  to  metaphysicize  against  metaphysics. 

IV. 

The  truth  of  the  object  of  consciousness  has  proven  to  consist 
neither  in  its  relation  to  other  objects  nor  to  the  subject,  for 
predicate  either  of  these  to  be  essential  and  it  turns  out  prag- 
matically to  be  unessential,  i.  e.,  to  postulate  the  relationship 
involves  inherent  contradiction.  The  object  has  now  presented 
itself  in  three  roles.  The  dialectic  of  the  certainty  of  sense  ex- 
hibited this  same  object  as  the  immediate  individual — the  im- 
mediateness  of  seeing,  hearing,  etc.  It  appeared  next  in  the 
guise  of  perception  as  the  thing,  and  lastly  in  the  outcome  as 
undetermined  universal,  (i.  e.,  undetermined  as  to  content),  or 
as  thought. 

The  undetermined  universal  is  now  (1)  the  existent  for  itself, 
(2)  absolute  self-subsistence, — as  related  to  an  unessential  it  is 
itself  unessential — and  (3)  absolute  activity — its  range  of  appli- 
cation is  unlimited — which  is  equivalent  to  absolute  rest  since  it 
is  contentless.  Consciousness  has  not  yet  transcended  the  deceit 
of  perception,  for  the  attempt  to  supply  a  content  or  an  object 
for  its  activity  must  be  discarded  as  unsuccessful.  Conscious- 
ness returns  to  itself;  itself  as  undetermined  universal,  for  it  has 
not  yet  seen  itself  in  this  contentless  form.  Again,  since  its 
content  is  lacking,  its  concept  (as  form)  is  still  in  question,  for  a 
concept  without  application  is  empty.  None  the  less  its  essence 
for  consciousness  is  an  objective  essence.  The  object  as  such 
subsists  so  long  as  consciousness  as  object  and  consciousness  as 
subject  have  not  exhibited  themselves  as  coextensive.  Thus  it 
is  customary  to  say  that  for  the  absolute  form  and  content  are 
identical. 

The  positive  result  of  the  outcome  is  that  the  untruth  of 
perception,  and  simultaneously  that  of  the  understanding,  is 
removed  and  consequently  the  concept  of  truth  is  attained. 
Until  the  experience  of  untruth  the  conception  of  truth  is  not 
realized.     This  concept  appears  as  the  existent ''  true  in  itself," 

[24] 


as  lacking  a  ''consciousness  in  itself,"  as  a  something  for  which 
the  understanding  stands  sponsor,  and  as  an  existent  of  which 
consciousness  is  aware  but  in  which  it  does  not  partake.  Con- 
sciousness that  is  not  consciousness  of  an  object  is  not  conscious- 
ness. It  is  form  without  content,  or  otherwise  activity  divorced 
of  passivity.  Consciousness  must  become  this  concept  in  all  its 
phases  and  is  then  become  thinking  consciousness. 

The  outcome  is  universal  in  the  purely  negative  sense  that  the 
one- sided  concept  formerly  adhered  to  is  discarded,  but  also  in 
the  positive  sense,  in  the  conviction  that  the  two  poles  of  the 
antithesis — the  "in  itself"  and  the  "for  another'' — are  essentially 
identical.  The  universal  in  question  would  seem  to  exhibit 
merely  the  form,  or  the  relation  of  the  one  pole  to  the  other,  but 
it  represents  as  well  the  content,  since  the  antithesis  can  have  no 
other  illustration  than  is  given  in  the  outcome.  Again,  the  con- 
tent is  universal  since  it  applies  to  any  "existent"  that  is  in  a 
determinate  way  both  "in  itself"  and  "for  another."  The 
experience  is  gained  that  form  and  content  as  univ^ersals,  (and 
hence  in  the  true  sense),  are  identical.  The  essential  nature  of 
the  outcome  is  that  it  presents  the  object  of  consciousness  as 
universally  "in  itself"  and  "for  another,"  so  that  the  result  is 
universal  in  the  absolute  sense. 

"^  The  undetermined  universal,  since  it  is  the  o^'ect  of  con- 
sciousness, may  be  considered  both  as  to  form  and  as  to  content 
and  to  examine  this  opposition  of  form  and  content  is  to  perceive 
that  we  are  again  on  familiar  ground.  The  content  is  on  the  one 
hand  an  universal  medium,  in  which  subsists  a  pluralism  of  prop- 
erties, and  on  the  other  a  self-contained  unity.  As  self-contained 
unity  it  is  viewed  as  the  "existent  in  itself;"  as  universal  medium 
it  implies  the  dissolution  of  the  thing's  self- subsistence.  The 
medium  reveals  itself  as  passivity,  as  the  "existent  for  another." 
The  experience  is  now  at  hand  that  these  ways  of  viewing  the 
universal  are  not  unconnected  but  are  essentially  related  through 
the  form:  they  are  the  modes  in  which  the  universal  reveals 
itself,  for  both  moments  are  in  essence  undetermined  universals 
and  are  predicated  as  essentially  contradictory  aspects  of  the 
same.  The  medium  is  to  be  viewed  as  identical  with  the  self- 
subsistence  of  a  group  of  properties  or  the  medium  as  universal 

[25] 


IS  nothing  more  than  this  self-subsistence.  This  self- subsistence 
implies  a  group  of  properties  that  are  essentially  exclusive;  the 
properties  are  different  but  exist  side  by  side.  The  self-subsist- 
ence however  implies  the  dissolution  of  the  differences  and  this 
the  pure  "existent  for  itself."  The  last  is  the  medium  and  this 
again  is  uothiug  unless  something  in  which  differences  subsist. 
On  the  one  hand  we  are  aware  of  the  uuiversal  as  the  medium, 
the  self- subsistence  of  the  properties,  or  the  essence  of  the  object, 
i.  e.,  the  universal  is  essentially  the  pluralism  of  the  several 
properties.  The  movement  of  the  dialectic  presents  two  mo- 
ments. On  the  one  view  the  object  is  a  collection  of  self-subsistent 
material,  on  the  other  it  is  a  self-subsistent  unity.  The  second 
aspect  does  not  properly  appear  until  the  first  has  presented 
itself  to  view.  Either  aspect  immediately  implies  the  other  or 
contains  this  implication  in  itself,  while  each  one  requires  the 
other  to  render  it  meaningful. 

This  implied  transition,  this  implication  of  the  other,  which 
each  moment  possesses  in  itself,  is  termed  force^*  (Kraft).  It 
is  in  nature  essentially  periodic,  for  the  points  of  view  are  seen 
to  repeat  themselves,  although  the  outcome  is  not  coincident 
with  the  starting  point.  The  one  moment,  the  truth  of  the  ob- 
iect  regarded  as  a  collection  of  propeities  self-subsistent  in  the 
medium,  its  development,  is  the  expressio'n}^  of  the  force.  The 
other  moment  the  vanishing  of  this  self-subsistence  is  the  force 
proper-  The  latter  result  cannot  however  be  obtained  until  the 
expression  is  realized,  for  it  follows  upon  this. 

On  the  view  that  these  distinctions  are  essentially  the  im- 
plications of  the  dialectic  they  are  seen  to  be  the  property  of  the 
understanding.  The  differences  in  question  are  not  in  them- 
selves distinguished;  they  are  distinctions  of  thought  or  they  are 
conceptual  in  nature.  The  aspects  of  the  object  are  only  mean- 
ingful in  so  far  as  they  exhibit  themselves  in  this  antithetical 
guise.  The  concept  of  the  process  represents  then  the  carrier  of 
the  two  moments,  or  the  substance  of  the  process.  Each  moment 
is  substantial  in  so  far  as  each  one  contains  the  process  by  im- 
plication in  itself.  We  have  as  features  of  this  concept,  on  the 
one  hand  the  two  vanishing  moments,  each  one  holding  the 
warrant  for  the  dissolution  of  the  other,  and  on  the  other  hand 

[20] 


the  force  proper  as  exclusive  unity.  The  force  as  such  only 
exists  (by  definition)  in  the  form  of  this  antithesis.  The  object 
of  consciousness  has  now  for  its  content  these  two  contradictory 
self-destructive  moments.  Being  for  consciousness  this  content 
is  objective-,  but,  since  it  is  contradictory  and  so,  self- destructive 
the  truth  becomes  the  non-objective,  (something  not  for  con- 
sciousness), or  tbe  "  inner  side  of  things-'' ^^^ 

The  "force"'  of  the  understanding  has  ceased  to  be  the 
simple  unitary  concept  that  it  was  in  its  origin.  Without  its 
development,  its  expression,  the  "force''  of  perceptiom  it  is 
unrealized  and  hence  presents  itself  as  postulating  and  as  depend- 
ent upon  this  expression.  It  contains  within  itself  the  impli- 
cation of  the  expression  but  it  contains  as  well  the  implication 
that  the  expression  be  dissolved,  or  it  presents  itself  as  unity, 
for  the  "  force"  of  perception  and  the  "force"  of  the  under- 
standing are  self- destructive  (contradictory)  and  cannot  exist 
side  by  side.  As  unity  its  essence  is  alien  to  it,  for  this  consists 
in  the  standing  contradiction.  Nevertheless  the  "other,"  (the 
alien  essence),  that  implies  expression  and  dissolution  is  itself 
"force."  If  then  "force"  as  unity  and  "force"  as  "other" 
are  self-subsistent  "forces  "  the  domination  of  unity  is  dissolved. 
On  the  other  hand  as  the  "  inner  side  "  of  things  or  the  non-ob- 
jective— perception  is  nothing  if  not  objective — the  development 
of  the  self-subsistent  properties  is  excluded  and  hence  "  force" 
is  another  again  distinct  from  ' '  force  ' '  proper. 

These  distinctions  are: 

As  content—  As  form— 

The  unity  of  The  medium  of  Postulating  Postulated 

the  two  "forces"        self-subsistent  (active).  (passive), 

(expression  and         materials, 
force  proper), 

"for  us,"  objective  "In  itself"  self-subsistent,  mutually 

or  for  a  conscious-  exclusive  and  opposed, 

ness. 

Ij  as  form  :    active,  postula-  IJ  as  content :  passive,  postulated, 

ting,   "for  itself"  "for  another." 

Then  as  content :  Then  as  form :  universal  medium 

"force"  proper.  of  different  properties. 

[27] 


The  non-objective  or  "inner  side  of  things"  is,  as  its  con- 
cept implies,  far  from  being  the  immediate  object  of  conscious- 
ness. The  nuderstanding  is  supposed  to  gain  this  vision  of  the 
true  background  of  things  through  the  medium  of  the  self- 
destructive  "  forces."  An  A,  which  contains  within  itself  the 
immediate  implication  of  a  nou-A,  is  self- contradictory.  For 
this  reason  we  call  it  appearance;  not  as  instance  or  as  illustra- 
tion but  as  a  totality  of  appearance  or  as  universal  Every 
genuine  appearance  as  such  implies  its  own  unreality.  Through 
the  mean  of  appearance  the  true  or  "inner"  side  becomes  the 
object  of  consciousness,  but  only  as  concept  without  content,  as 
the  negation  of  appearance. 

Because  then  of  the  contradiction  of  perceptive  and  defini- 
tional necessity,  the  understanding  distinguishes  the  sensible 
world  or  the  world  of  appearances  from  the  supersensible  or  the 
true  world-  The  mean  that  unites  the  understanding  with  the 
inner  truth  is  appearance,  and  it  is  this  because  it  does  not 
represent  truth  itself  but  rather  the  pathway  to  truth.  It  is  the 
medium  through  which  truth  is  seen.  To  render  the  notion  of 
truth  intelligible  we  require  the  notion  of  apparent  truth  or 
falsity.  The  absolute  universal  which  unites  conceptually  the 
antithesis  of  individual  and  universal  is  a  thought  distinction 
and  hence  furnished  by  the  understanding.  If  the  "  inner 
truth  "  is  to  be  perceived  at  all  it  is  by  this  side  of  consciousness. 
On  this  view  the  sensible  world  takes  its  place  as  the  world  of 
appearance  in  contradistinction  to  a  supersensible  or  the  true 
world — the  transient  "present"  as  over  against  the  permanent 
"  beyond." 

Our  object  is  then  this  antithesis,  the  two  extremes  which 
consciousness  on  the  side  of  the  understanding  has  before  it. 
The  mean  that  unites  conceptually  the  two  extremes  is  appear- 
ance. The  "beyond"  has  as  yet  no  content.  It  is  only  defined 
as  the  negation  of  appearance  and  as  simple  universal.  This 
mode  of  the  "beyond"  is  the  Kantian  sort.  As  such  then  it  is 
unknowable,  V)eing  defined  as  that  which  lies  beyond  conscious- 
ness. Because  the  reason  is  too  shortsighted  or  limited,  it  is 
only  known  through  its  manifestations  in  appearances.  But  now 
if  this  "beyond"'  be  forever  unknowable;  if  the  curtain  can  never 

[28] 


€3^ 


be  raised  and  its  content  revealed,  then  there  is  no  choice  but 
to  cling  to  appearances,  i.  e.,  to  hold  that  true  which  is  not  true  \ 
by  definition. 

Nevertheless  the  supersensible  has  arisen  and  is  at  hand.  It 
comes  from  appearance  and  appearance  is  its  mean,  its  e^^sence, 
indeed  its  consummation.  It  is  the  truth  of  appearance.  But 
the  truth  and  essence  of  the  perceived  world  is  that  it  be  appear- 
ance, and  thus  the  supersensible  is  apijearauce  as  appeanmce 
and  hence  the  world  of  immediate  sensuous  certainty  and  per- 
ception. But  appearance  is  the  sensible  world  of  perception 
stripped  of  its  reality  and  predicated  as  having  its  truth  in  the 
"beyond."  The  sensible  world  as  in  itself  reality  is  not 
appearance. 

Appearance  and  the  "inner  side''  immediately  imply  one 
another  and  the  necessity  of  this  implication  is  essentially  defi- 
nitional. Appearances  are  the  implications  of  the  "inner"  — 
the  "inner"  is  the  legislator — appearances  are  legislated  for- 
Appearances  are  the  eajpression  of  the  "inner."  The  "inner" 
postulates  its  expression  and  is  in  so  far  active,  while  appearance 
is  the  postulated  and  is  thus  passive-  This  distinction  as  the 
universal  aspect  of  the  play  of  "force"  is  its  truth  or  the  law  of 
"force."  The  "inner"  appears  then  as  a  kingdom  of  laws,^^ 
beyond  the  pe"rceived  world  and  legislating  for  appearance. 
When  the  curtain  is  raised  on  this  "beyond,"  this  self-active 
legislator,  the  self-consciousness  is  revealed- 

This  kingdom  of  laws  is  however  only  the  ^'first  trutK''  and 
does  not  wholly  account  for  appearance.  The  law  is  in  some  sense 
present  in  the  process  of  change  but  does  not  supply  the  entire 
reality  of  the  process.  It  can  never  supply  the  existential  ele- 
ment. Under  different  circumstances  the  law  is  differently 
realized.  Thus  there  remains  for  appearances  an  aspect  unac- 
counted for  by  the  "inner  truth''  of  the  supersensible  world." 

This  weakness  of  law  to  account  for  appearance  appears  to 
lie  in  its  universal  character;  in  its  jack  of  determinateness. 
Indeed  the  kingdom  is  essentially  a  plurality  and  this  contradicts 
the  supposition  that  the  truth  of  the  understanding  is  in  nature 
an  unitary  something.  In  so  far  now  as  this  kingdom  is  one 
law— not  law  in  general—  it  is  determinate,  and  what  we  would 

[29] 


wish  to  do  would  be  to  reduce  all  law  to  one  law,  e.  g.,  the  law 
of  gravitatioD.  But  by  this  very  process  the  law  loses  its 
determinateuess.  Its  rauge  of  application  becomes  more  and 
more  general.  The  concept  arrived  at  is  only  the  very  general 
one  of  the  universal  conformity  to  law  of  all  reality,  a  concept 
however  with  a  content,  a  feature  lacking  in  the  "inner  truth" 
as  first  conceived,  but  one  that  in  no  way  accounts  for  the  sensi- 
ble world  itself. 

Eeflection  upon  the  problem  of  change  and  its  explanation 
continually  points  to  the  standing  contrast  of  these  two  worlds — 
the  one  thedomain  of  rationality,  of  definition,  of  description,  the 
intellectual,  the  fixed,  the  birthplace  of  inferences;  the  other  the 
realm  of  perception,  the  changeable,  the  world  of  appearances, 
where  accidents,  the  unclassified  and  undescribed  residue  of  ex- 
isting things  are  born.  It  is  in  the  latter  sphere  that  natural 
law  seems  to  find  its  realization.  The  concept  of  law,  we  are 
tempted  to  say,  cannot  be  the  essential  aspect  of  change,  for  the 
concept  is  only  created  in  answer  to  a  practical  demand.  It  is 
in  essence  an  after-thought,  a  postulate  superadded.  If  the 
determinate  character  of  law  is  that  which  adheres  to  appearance 
or  has  its  sufficient  reason  in  appearances  than  this  feature  of 
law  is  accidental.  We  are  accustomed  to  contrast  the  concept 
with  what  is  accidental  to  our  formula  of  change,  but  in  devel- 
oping this  contrast  we  are  continually  reminded  that  what  is 
accidental  is  incidental  as  well.  The  accidental  as  the  unexplained 
residue  is  father  to  the  concept,  for  its  existence  provokes  a 
logical  demand.  It  arouses  an  activity  whose  response  is  the 
concept.  As  such  it  is  a  "force"  responsible  for  the  creation  of 
its  own  antithesis,  and  on  this  view  it  is  prior  to  its  antithesis. 
The  concept  that  does  not  arise  in  answer  to  a  practical  demand 
is  a  phantasy  of  the  imagination  and  itself  an  accident,  and  thus 
the  meaningful  or  intelligible  concept  is  essentially  dependent 
upon  the  phenomenal.  Nevertheless  since  the  accidental  is  not 
meaningful  until  its  contrast  with  what  is  essential  comes  to 
light,  the  concept  is  prior  to  the  appearance.  If  the  latter  be 
contrasted  with  the  concept,  then  it  is  the  concept  of  law  that 
exhibits  the  law's  inner  necessity. 

A  law  establishes  or  states  a  relationship  that  obtains  among 

[30] 


appearances  and  at  the  same  time  presnpposes  a  difference  or  a 
distinction.  This  difference  is  however  a  general  one;  the  law 
furnishes  no  test  of  its  own  application.  The  distinction 
supplied  is  not  one  which  cleaves  to  the  sensible  world  itself  but 
is  furnished  by  the  understanding.  When  for  example  we  speak 
of  a  positive  electricity,  we  at  once  suppose  another  kind,  a 
negative  electricity.  This  distinction  is  not  one  that  attaches  to 
the  thing  in  itself  but  is  rather  supplied  by  the  subject.  The 
necessity  of  the  law  which  describes  the  behavior  of  positive  and 
negative  electricity  with  reference  to  one  another,  is  the  necessity 
which  follows  on  the  definition  of  the  describer.  This  is  to  say 
that  it  is  its  own  necessity  which  the  understanding  predicates, 
and  not  a  necessity  that  inheres  in  the  natural  event  itself. 

In  so  far  however  as  the  law  is  recognized  at  all  it  is  in  the 
sensible  world.  It  is  always  this  last  which  gives  illustration  to 
the  law.  If  then  the  supersensible  world  be  only  mediate,  if  it  be 
only  known  through  appearances,  its  characterization  as  the  king- 
dom of  laws,  as  the  unchangeable  image  of  the  perceived  world,  is 
lost.  Conceived  only  through  appearances  the  sensible  world  be- 
comes its  only  reality.  It  is  through  the  experience  of  this  result 
that  consciousness  is  aware  that  it  is  indeed  its  own  contradiction, 
which  is  at  hand.  This  contradiction  is  the  "  inverted  world.^^ 
The  '  'inverted  world' '  is  the  construct  of  the  self',  the  contradiction 
is  produced  by  me-  I  distinguish  myself  from  the  conclusion 
that  my  judgment  draws;  it  is  the  behavior  of  my  own  conscious- 
ness that  must  be  further  examined.  The  procedure  of  meta- 
physic  has  then  no  alternative  but  to  view  these  results  in  the 
light  of  their  newly  found  origin,  as  the  constructs  of  the  self's 
consciousness.  The  second  supersensible  world,  the  "  inverted 
world,"  is  the  antithesis  of  the  first  and  of  itself,  for  it  contains 
this  implication  within  itself.  An  appearance  is  genuine  if  it 
contains  within  itself  the  implication  of  its  own  unreality  and  it 
is  after  this  fashion  that  the  supersensible  world  presents  itself. 
It  is  appearance  as  appearance.  An  appearance  is  an  A  which 
implies  the  truth  of  a  non-A.  Thus  what  is  in  the  first  super- 
sensible world  sweet,  is  in  the  second  or  "  inverted  world  "  sour; 
the  moral  principles  which  the  one  world  exalts  are  the  prin- 
piples  of  evil  in  the  second.     The  supersensible  world  as  the 

[31] 


realm  of  the  self's  activity  is  appearance,  and  since  this  appear- 
ance has  become  object  of  consciousness,  now  for  the  first  time 
consciousness  is  become  the  self-consciousness.^^ 

The  Truth  of  the  Certainty  of  Self. 

The  truth  of  the  certainty  of  the  modes  of  consciousness 
considered  up  to  now  has  been  distinct  from  the  certainty  itself. 
Up  to  now  truth  has  been  for  consciousness,  but  always  in  some 
sense  distinct  from  consciousness.  In  the  mill  of  dialectic  this 
truth — the  "existent"  of  sensuous  certainty,  the  "thing"  of 
perception,  the  "force"  (Kraft)  of  the  understanding — was 
seen  to  disappear.  Every  one  of  these  three  modes  of  supposed 
certainty,  each  after  its  own  manner,  played  th©  part  of  a 
"  thing  in  itself,"  and  when  each  "in  itself"  remained  unintel- 
ligible without  reference  "to  another,"  the  truth  and  the 
certainty  vanished  together. 

Dialectic  has  then  to  treat  of  a  mode  of  certainty  that  has 
not  previously  appeared.  The  alternative  immediately  at  hand 
is  the  identification  of  certainty  with  the  "existent"  conscious 
of  itself  (Selbstbewusstein),  and  it  is  in  the  role  of  this  alterna- 
tive that  the  self- consciousness  appears.  To  test  the  validity  of 
the  identity  of  certainty  and  consciousness  in  its  new  guise  is 
the  next  task  of  the  natural  dialectic.  The  immediate,  the  "in 
itself,"  shall  not  be  obtained  conceptually  but  shall  be  intuited. 
The  certain  fact  is  the  fact  of  consciousness.  The  "  for  another' ' 
shall  be  robbed  to  pay  the  "in  itself." 

The  certainty  in  question  lies  "in  itself"  but  it  is  no  less 
"for  another;"for  in  so  farasit  is  "for  itself"  it  is  for  conscious- 
ness. In  the  sense  that  the  ego  is  the  certainty  it  is  "/or  itself," 
but  in  the  sense  that  it  is  its  own  object  or  the  object  of  conscious- 
ness— in  the  sense  that  is  object — it  is  "for  another." 

The  philosophical  satisfaction  which  is  our  gain  in  viewing 
the  ego  as  the  certain  fact  of  consciousness  is  that  we  have  our 
hands  on  the  elusive  individual;  if  an  illustration  of  singularity, 
of  uniqueness,  is  to  be  found,  it  is  here. 

On  this  view  the  world  of  j)erception  presents  itself  as  pure 
negation — negation  of  the  self — while  the  self  is  the  negation  of 
the  perceived  world.     In  this  relationship  the  self  is  "  in  itself," 

[32] 


but  it  is  also  ''for  another,"  viz:  the  perceived  world.  Viewed 
in  itself  it  is  viewed  as  the  certain  or  the  true;  in  relation  to  the 
other  as  the  false  or  as  appearance.  N^evertheless  this  antithesis 
of  certainty  and  appearance  is  essential,  for  without  it  there 
remains  but  the  empty  tautology,  the  "I  am  I."  To  seek  the 
true  is  to  suppose  the  possibility  of  the  false.  Our  relationship 
presents  a  complete  reciprocity.  Does  the  certainty  of  self 
require  the  concept  of  apparent  certainty  or  falsity  to  give  it 
meaning,  then  for  like  reason  does  appearance  find  its  justifica- 
tion in  antithesis  to  a  supposed  certainty.  Is  the  ego  in  any 
sense  self-subsistent,  then  so  in  the  same  sense  must  be  the 
non-ego.  The  need,  which  the  ego  has  for  the  non-ego,  without 
which  the  ego  is  devoid  of  meaning,  is  desire.^^  Those  aspects 
of  the  non-ego  which  have  a  meaning  and  value  and  hence  an 
interest  for  the  ego  are  in  so  far  living^^  (organic).  Those 
features  of  the  non-ego  which  lack  significance  for  the  ego  are 
in  so  far  inorganic-  It  is  the  task  of  philosophy  to  render  the 
inorganic  meaningful;  to  indicate  the  values  that  attach  to  the 
varied  phases  of  the  cosmos,  designated  in  its  elementary  state, 
the  perceived  world.  Thus  through  the  medium  of  dialectic  the 
inorganic  constantly  tends  to  become  organic.  The  real  cosmos 
in  its  full  signification  is  the  final  term  of  a  developmental  process. 

"What  of  the  non-ego  is  of  meaning  for  the  ego  thereby  ceases 
to  be  non-ego.  Thus  is  its  reference,  its  value,  destroyed  and 
created  by  the  same  act.  Its  truth  is,  as  it  was  before,  both  "in 
itself  and  ''for  another"  and  in  this  consists  its  individuality 
or  the  substance  of  its  life.  In  so  far  as  the  process  of  rendering 
meaningful  the  non-ego  is  viewed  as  living  process  or  as  experi- 
ence is  the  concept  of  pure  ego  attained.  In  so  far  as  the  non-ego 
(as  object)  is  absorbed  in  the  ego  (subject)  does  there  not  result 
philosophical  satisfaction,  and  must  result,  for  the  outcome  is 
truth.  The  inorganic,  as  the  negation  and  object  of  desire  of 
consciousness,  is  a  consciousness.  "The  sell's  consciousness 
attains  its  satisfaction  only  in  another  self's  consciousness." 
Here  first  in  the  "I  which  is  we  and  the  we  which  is  I"  does  the 
concept  of  mind  make  its  appearance. 

In  the  reciprocal  relationship  of  ego  and  non-ego  the  be- 
Jiavior  of  the  one  is  always   in  some  sense   behavior    of  the 

[33] 


other.  lu  different  senses  each  is  at  the  same  time  knower 
and  thing  known.  The  life  of  the  selfs  consciousness  as  "in 
itself"  consists  in  the  overthrow  of  its  neg:atives  and  indifferents — 
a  one -directional  process.  The  life  of  the  other  is  equally  a  one- 
directional  process  but  in  the  opposite  sense.  The  life  of  the 
one  is  not  compatible  then  with  that  of  the  other;  each  is  com- 
mitted to  the  death  of  the  other,  and  must  enter  the  contest,  ^^ 
for  the  task  prescribed  it  is  to  raise  the  certainty  of  self  to  the 
rank  of  the  truth  for  it,  and  the  truth  for  the  other.  The 
individual  which  has  not  risked^^  this  experience  has  not  attained 
the  truth  which  the  starting  point  assumed,  (viz,  the  certainty 
of  self),  for  it  has  not  yet  seen  itself  in  the  other. 

Through  this  very  process  however  is  the  initial  postulate 
of  the  certainty  of  self  destroyed.  Does  the  non-ego  turn  out  to 
be  the  essential  then  the  ego  is  the  unessential.  Does  the  ego 
survive  either  actually  through  the  act  or  as  the  final  term  of  a 
process  conceived  as  an  ideal,  then  there  is  lost  the  antitheses 
which  rendered  it  meaningful,  for  if  all  is  ego,  what  is  the  utility 
of  the  certainty  of  self  postulated  as  an  initial  truth  ? 

In  the  experience  of  this  process  the  self  at  first  appears 
alone  as  the  self-subsistent  certainty;  but  it  required  to  make  it 
intelligible  an  antithetical  term.  This  term  in  so  far  as  it  turned 
out  to  have  a  positive  content  or  to  be  intelligible  was  in  so  far 
the  possession  of  the  self;  in  so  far  as  it  was  mere  negation,  or 
unrealized  possibility,  it  dissolved.  The  final  result  is  the  loss 
of  the  initial  truth  on  the  death  of  the  antithetical  term. 

The  self,  because  of  its  behavior  in  the  context  of  this  dia- 
lectic and  after  the  experience  of  it,  is  become  master-  The 
abstract  existence,  the  non-self,  for  the  like  reason  and  since  it 
too  was  essential,  is  become  servanf^'^  These  correlatives  are 
not  intelligible  apart  from  one  another.  The  truth  then  of  the 
certainty  of  self  lies  in  this  serving  consciousness,  for  predicate 
it  unessential  and  our  initial  truth  vanishes.  It  follows  that  our 
essential  pole  is  reversed,  and  the  truth  of  the  certainty  of  self 
is  destroyed. 

The  consciousness  of  the  self,  which  first  appeared  as  abstract 
or  simple  ego  in  the  certainty  of  self,  has  come  then  to  present 
many  differences  in  its  make  up.  At  first  characterized  as  sim- 
ple, self-subsistent,  inert,  it  is  become  producing  or  formative 

[34J 


iu  nature.  Its  life  is  conserved  through  its  relation  to  an  antithet- 
ical term  (thingness).  Because  of  its  formative  nature  it  is  free, 
in  the  sense  that  it  is  controlled  only  by  the  necessity  of  its  own 
nature,  but  its  freedom  only  is  intelligible  as  in  contrast  to  a 
serving  consciousness — the  visualized,  the  imaged,  the  external 
existent.  It  is  former  or  producer  because  of  a  thing  formed  or 
produced  and  in  this  sense  it  is  free.  Again  the  substance  of  its 
life  is  that  it  thinks,  and  thought  deals  in  concepts,  not  images 
or  objects.  The  last  are  the  wares  of  the  serving  consciousness, 
which  he  lays  at  the  feet  of  his  monarch  which  is  thought.  But 
a  monarch  without  a  vassel  is  a  meaningless  term;  the  freedom 
of  a  thinking  consciousness  is  clear  because  of  a  consciousness 
whose  perceptions  are  given.  Not  the  consciousness  of  a  world 
order  subject  to  teleological  or  mechanical  description,  whether 
this  consciousness  be  my  own  or  an  alien  one,  is  the  essential 
consciousness,  but  the  thinking  consciousness,  which  cannot  be 
represented  as  other  than  mine  and  inseparable  from  me.  The 
exaltation  of  this  free  or  thinking  consciousness  as  an  ethical 
end,  is  the  principle  of  the  Stoic.  ^^ 

The  freedom  of  the  thinking  consciousness  is  exercised  how- 
ever no  less  in  the  realm  of  the  serving  consciousness  than  in  its 
own  domain.  The  macrocosm,  the  world  of  individual  things  and 
natural  events,  calls  for  description  and  explanation,  and  hence 
presents  a  choice  to«microcosm  as  to  how  this  task  is  to  be 
accomplished.  The  microcosm  is  free  within  certain  limits.^* 
Not  as  the  ruling  consciousness  does  it  find  its  truth  in  the  serv- 
ing consciousness  but  ''on  its  throne  even  as  in  its  chains"  in 
the  concept  of  its  freedom.  Its  essence  is  thought  (an  abstract 
essence)  and  consists  not  in  the  actual  exercise  of  its  freedom, 
but  in  a  self- subsistence  that  stands  apart  from  the  serving  con- 
sciousness. Standing  apart  from  the  world  of  individual  things 
as  a  forming  principle,  it  has  in  itself  no  content  but  its  content 
is  given.  The  content  is  alien  to  it,  and  in  so  far  as  it  thinks, 
it  thinks  an  alien  existence. 

In  this  manner  is  the  dilemma  of  Stoicism  presented.  The 
good,  the  true,  is  the  attainment  of  pure  reason,  contentless 
thought.     But  would  the  free  consciousness  think,  it  must  think 

[35] 


a  content. ^-^  The  end  is  forbidden  through  its  own  legislation. 
The  ideal  hypothesized  prevents  its  own  attainment  and  our 
interest  in  it  is  lost  because  of  its  consequent. 

For  the  Stoic  the  world  of  perception  is  the  unessential. 
His  task  is  the  attainment  of  a  world  of  pure  thought  the  chief 
feature  of  which  is  that  it  shall  be  free.  But  free  of  what  ? 
Why,  the  world  of  perception.  The  latter  is  essential  then  on 
the  Stoic's  own  premises,  for  it  is  presupposed  by  him  if  his 
freedom  is  to  have  a  meaning. 

The  realization  of  this  dilemma,  to  be  aware  that  this 
mode  of  the  "in  itself  is  but  an  incomplete  negation  of  the 
"other,"  is  the  standpoint  of  scepticism.  For  the  Stoic  the 
dilemma  did  not  appear  as  such,  by  the  Sceptic  it  is  realized 
and  accej^ted. 

Dialectic  has  now  arrived  at  a  new  station  in  her  progress. 
Convinced  of  the  freedom  of  the  thinking  self  as  the  negation  of 
the  world  of  perception  (the  unessential),  the  Sceptic  is  aware 
that  his  truth  has  vanished  without  knowing  how.  The  world 
of  perception  is  repudiated  for  the  thinking  self,  but  by  this  very 
act  is  the  truth  of  the  thinking  self  destroyed.  The  nothingness 
of  the  materials  furnished  by  perception  is  asserted  by  the  subject 
and  yet  the  subject  sees,  feels,  hears.  Moral  principles  are  exalted 
as  the  ruling  principles  of  action  and  their  nothingness  asserted 
in  the  same  breath.  The  pleasure  of  th^ceptic  is  to  remain  in 
contradiction  with  himself.  Let  one  assert  that  ''a"  is  ''b,"  he 
will  prove  the  opposite  on  the  same  premises. 

For  the  sophistic  temperament,  the  presence  of  inner  contra- 
diction is  a  satisfaction.  Its  delight  is  to  hold  the  antithetical 
poles  apart;  to  see  the  truth  vanish  the  instant  one  attempts  to 
lay  hands  on  it.  The  rationalistic  temperament  in  the  presence 
of  this  dilemma  is  the  "unfortunate  consciousness."  The  latter 
feels  the  need  and  indeed  the  necessity  of  overcoming  the  dilemma 
but  is  at  the  same  time  convinced  of  its  binding  force. 

This  dual  consciousness,  which  presents  the  inner  contradic- 
tion, must  be  unified.  The  most  prominent  feature  of  this  unity 
is  as  yet  the  radical  difference  of  the  thinking  (invariant)  self 
and  the  serving  (variant)  self.  We  perceive  the  law  as  in  some 
pense  present  in  the  process  of  change.     By  the  act  of  putting 

[36] 


that  red  thing  yoDder  in  the  class  of  red  things;  in  so  far  as  that 
quality  (red)  is  a  familiar  quality,  is  the  universal  perceived  as 
present  income  sense  in  that  thing  yonder.  The  serving  or  alien 
consciousness  perceives  the  thinking  consciousness  in  itself. 
But  the  thinking  consciousness,  in  so  far  as  it  thinks,  thinks  an 
alien  content,  or  it  perceives  the  other  in  itself.  Each  conscious- 
ness perceives  the  other  in  itself,  and  the  motive  for  the  belief 
of  the  "unfortunate  consciousness"  that  in  truth  it  must  be  one 
consciousness,  free  of  contradiction,  finds  its  justification  in  this 
reciprocal  relationship. 

[37] 


NOTES. 


Page  13,  Note  1. 

"  The  existence  of  finite  things,  (and  so  of  finite  ideas),  cannot  be  explained 
according  to  notions  of  cause  and  effect.  With  the  appreciation  of  this  law  all 
philosophy  begins;  for  without  it  we  have  never  the  need  to  philosophize— with- 
out it  all  our  knowledge  is  merely  empirical,  a  progression  from  cause  to  effect." 
{Schelling's  s'ammtliche  Werke,  Abth.  I.  Bd.  /.,  8.  368.) 

Page  14,  Note  2. 

Fichte  {Soimmtliche  Werke,  Abth.  I.Bd.  I.,  S.  422-423)  divides  the  objects  of 
consciousness  (Vorstellungen)  into  two  classes,  (1)  those  accompanied  by  the 
feeling  of  freedom  and  (2)  those  accompanied  by  the  feeling  of  necessity.  Of 
the  first  class  it  is  meaningless  to  ask  why  they  are  so  and  not  otherwise  (in  the 
absolute  sense),  since  the  law  of  suflScient  reason  does  not  govern  the  domain 
of  freedom.  They  are  so  because  we  say  they  shall  be  so;  had  we  said  they 
should  be  otherwise  then  they  would  be  otherwise.  The  system  of  ideas  accom- 
panied by  the  feeling  of  necessity  is  called  experience,  and  it  is  the  problem  of 
philosophy  to  furnish  the  sufficient  reason  for  this  second  class. 

(Thus  the  mathematician  may  select  his  parameters  in  accordance  with  any 
conditions  that  he  may  see  fit  to  impose,  the  number  of  conditions  being  only 
limited  by  the  number  of  parameters.  He  has  certain  degrees  of  freedom.  The 
astronomer  is  free  to  regard  the  sun  as  revolving  around  the  earth  or  vice  I'ersa, 
his  choice  being  governed  in  this  case  by  the  simplicity  of  description  that 
results  from  the  latter  selection.  Again  the  physicist,  the  biologist,  or  the  psy- 
chologist arbitrarily  dictates  the  conditions  of  any  given  experiment.) 

The  science  of  the  first  class  of  ideas  would  be,  for  Fichte,  scientific  method, 
that  of  the  second  class,  philosophy.  The  phenomena  of  mind  brought  out  by 
the  dialectic  as  a  necessary  tendency  are  called  then  experiences  by  Hegel  in 
the  same  sense  as  the  term  is  employed  by  Fichte. 

Page  14,  Note  3. 

Compare  in  this  connection  two  passages,  the  first  from  Fichte  and  the 
second  from  Schelling. 

"If  it  be  undeniable  that  the  speculative  reason  is  indebted  for  every  human 
advance  that  she  has  accomplished  to  the  comments  of  scepticism  on  the  uncer- 
tainty of  her  previous  resting  point,  *  *  *  then  nothing  is  more  desirable  than 
that  the  sceptic  should  crown  his  work  and  that  the  investigating  reason  should 
attain  her  exalted  end."  (I.  1,  3.) 

"How  infinitely  more  has  the  sceptic  served  the  cause  of  true  philosophy  by 
declaring  war  on  every  system  claiming  universal  validity !  how  infinitely 
more  than  the  dogmatist,  who  would  have  all  minds  swear  by  the  symbol  of  a 
theoretical  science!"     (1.  1,  307.) 

Page  15,  Note  4. 

This  is  the  view  of  Schelling. 

"Philosophy  must  not  be  a  creation  that  only  causes  one  to  admire  the  inge- 

[38] 


nuity  of  the  author.     She  must  portray  the  march  of   the  human   mind  itself 
not  that  of  this  or  that  individual's."  (I.  1,  293.) 

Page  16,  Note  5. 

*  *  *  "the  thing  is,  and  it  is  only  because  it  is."  {Phiinomenologie 
des  Oeistes,  Ooebhardt,  Bamberg  und  Wicrzburg,  1807,  S.  23)  Also  Schelling 
Werke,  Abth.  I.  Bd.  /.,  Moglichkeit  einer  Form  der  Philosophie,  and  Fichte 
Werke,  Abth.  I.  Bd.  /.,  Grundlage  der  gesammten  Wissenschaftslehre. 

Page  17,  Note  6. 

"Now  the  more  immediate  the  experience  so  much  the  nearer  its  disappear- 
ance. Indeed  the  intuition  of  sense,  so  long  as  it  is  merely  this,  borders  on 
nothing.  *  *  *  But  so  long  as  the  intuition  turns  to  objects,  i.  e.  so 
long  as  it  is  sensuous,  it  runs  no  risk  of  losing  itself.  The  ego  in  so  far  as  it 
discovers  opposition,  is  necessitated  to  contrast  itself  with  this,  i.  e.,  to  return 
unto  itself .  *  *  *  Were  I  to  pursue  the  intellectual  intuition  I  would  cease 
to  live.     I  go  then  'out  of  time  into  eternity.'  "     {Hchelling,  Werke,  I.  1,  325,) 

Page  17,  Note  7. 

A  procedure,  by  which  that  individual  thing  yonder  might  be  characterized 
uniquely  or  put  in  a  class  by  itself,  is  suggested  by  the  law  of  traditional  logic 
viz.,  "as  the  intension  of  our  descriptive  terms  is  increased,  the  extension  is 
decreased."  Thus  by  characterizing  that  individual  yonder  with  a  succession 
of  predicates  and  so  excluding  other  objects  which  lack  these  predicates,  we 
might  hope  to  arrive  at  last  at  a  class  whose  only  illustration  is  the  individual 
thing  in  question.  Of  course  the  law  does  not  hold  if  •  the  extension  of  our 
delimiting  predicates  gives  a  resultant  class  whose  extension  is  not  limited  and 
the  only  way  to  determine  whether  this  extension  be  finite  or  not  is  by  the  path 
of  experiment.  There  appear  however  to  be  practical  difficulties— not  to  speak 
of  the  logical  contradiction  at  hand  when  such  a  problem  is  stated— involved  in 
a  complete  canvass  of  possible  experience.  Moreover  no  account  of  this  experi- 
ence can  be  given  save  in  terms  of  universals.  If  contradictory  predicates  be 
attached  to  the  individual  in  question,  it  is  at  once  put  in  the  zero  class  and  is 
admittedly  nothing,  but  excluding  this  case  let  predicate  be  heaped  on  predicate 
as  long  as  we  please,  the  extension  of  the  final  class  having  all  these  predicates 
is  as  much  open  to  question  as  before.  Nor  is  this  all.  Not  even  one  predicate 
can  be  attached  with  assurance.  Any  experiment  is  subject  to  error.  Any 
measurement  has  a  probable  error  attached.  A  knowledge  of  facts  can  be  only 
approximated,  never  exactly  attained  through  experiment.  The  real  fact  is  the 
limit  of  a  series  of  approximations,  forever  beyond  the  reach  of  knowledge  by 
experiment,  a  "  thing  in  itself." 

On  this  latter  point  cf.  Prof.  E.  A.  Singer,  Jr.,  "  KanVs  First  Antinomy, ^^ 
Philosophical  Review,  July,  19U9. 

Page  18,  Note  8. 

Space  and  time  in  the  "  transcendentale  Aesthetik"  (Kant's  Kritik  der 
reinen  Vernunft)  are  supposed  to  account  for  individuality. 

[39] 


Page  IS,  Note  9. 

It  is  clear  that  the  individual  here  plays  the  part  of  the  Kantian  "  Ding  an 
sich  " — the  "  Ding  an  sicli  "  of  the  transcendental  esthetic.  The  real  individ- 
ual in  this  connection  is  unknowable,  and  answers  appropriately  to  the  concept 
of  nothing.  Viewed  as  an  ideal— as  the  limit  of  a  series  of  approximations— it 
is  the  absolute.  The  identification  of  the  concept  of  nothing  with  that  of  the 
absolute  may  be  not  without  motive.  Thus  if  the  absolute  be  that  which  has  all 
predicates,  (the  God  of  rationalism),  then  it  is  nothing,  for  that  which  is  every- 
thing is  nothing.  It  may  be  noted  in  addition  that  the  existence  of  the  real 
fact,  forever  beyond  the  reach  of  experiment,  is  one  of  the  fundamental 
postulates  of  physical  science.  It  is  on  this  common  ground  according  to 
Schelling  that  realism  and  idealism  merge  and  become  identical. 

Page  19,  Note  10. 

The  "Ding  ansich^''  of  Kant  appears  in  some  connections  as  '■'■  Empfindung'''' 
a  content  somehow  alien  to  the  subject,  the  individual  of  the  present  context. 
Schelling  in  a  foot  note  expressly  designates  this  a  zero.  (I.  1,  95. >  Cf.  Note  6, 
first  sentence.     Cf .  note  12,  the  last  quotation. 

Again:  "to  be  afifected  is  nothing  but  negative  activity.  An  absolutely 
passive  being  is  absolutely  nothing  (a  nihil  privativum) .''''     (I.  1,  369.) 

Page  19,  Note  11. 

This  discussion  should  be  read  in  the  light  of  Fichte's  Bestimmung  des 
Menschen.''     (I.  2,  199-247.) 

Page  20,  Note  12. 

"In  our  experience  <7te  thing,  that  which  is  determined  independently  of  our 
freedom  and  that  according  to  which  our  knowledge  should  fashion  itself,  and 
intelligence,  that  which  knows,  are  indissolubly  connected.  The  philosopher  is 
able  to  abstract  the  one  from  the  other  and  has  then  abstracted  from  experience 
and  raised  himself  above  these.  Let  him  abstract  from  the  latter  and  he  gets 
an  intelligence  i7i  it  self,  {that  is,  one  abstracted  from  its  relation  to  experience) ; 
let  him  abstract  from  the  first  and  he  gets  a  thing  in  itself,  (that  is,  one 
abstracted  from  the  fact  of  its  occurrence  in  experience),  as  the  explanation  of 
experience.  The  first  procedure  is  idealism,  the  second  dogmatism.''''  {Fichte, 
Werke,  I.  1,  425-6.) 

The  following  from  Schelling  can  hardly  be  translated:  "Bedingen  heisst 
die  Handlung,  wodurch  etwas  zum  Ding  wird,  bedingt,  das  was  zum  Ding 
gemacht  ist,  woraus  zugleich  erhellt,  dass  nichts  durch  sich  selbst  als  Ding 
gesetzt  sein  kann,  d.  h.  dass  ein  unbedingtes  Ding  ein  Widerspruch  ist. "  (1. 1,  166.) 

Page  22,  Note  13. 

For  Fichte  the  term  "■Reflexion"'  is  opposed  to  "Abstraction.''^  "Abstrac- 
tion'''' is  the  mental  act,  through  freedom,  of  separating  the  form  from  the 
content,  while  "Eefle.Hon'^  is  the  act  of  supplying  form  with  a  given  content. 
(1.1,67.) 

Page  26,  Note  14. 
The  monads,  the  Leibnitzian  substance,  are  immaterial   and  besouled, 

[40] 


They  are  perceiving  forces.  The  activity  of  the  monads  is  an  activity  of  per- 
ceptions. The  tendency  of  one  perception  to  pass  into  another  is  called  ''desireJ^ 
Cf.  Note  19. 

In  Fichte  (I.  2,  101)  the  position  is  assumed  for  the  moment  that  I 
am  myself  the  expression  of  a  force  alien  to  me  (natural  necessity)—!  am 
■what  natural  necessity  makes  of  me;  to  be  discarded  for  the  resolution  that  I 
will  be  this  force  myself,  (through  freedom)— I  will  be  what  I  chose  to  make 
myself— I  will  be  my  own  ultimate  ground  of  action. 

The  object  here,  as  the  expression  of  a  force  alien  to  it,  (the  dialectic  pro- 
cess), is  what  the  dialectic  has  made  it.  Its  features  have  been  supplied  by  the 
process.  As  thought-construct  it  is  the  expression  of  the  thinking  force.  Cf. 
Note  20. 

The  terms  motion  {Beiuegung)  and  expression  {Aeusserung)  may  be 
explained  by  comparing  their  use  with  Schelling's  habit  of  thought.  In  so  far 
as  the  mind  views  her  phenomena  as  changing  creations  of  her  own  is  she  aware 
of  a  principal  of  activity  within  herself.  "  Such  a  being  is  living."  "  Live  in 
the  visible  analogue  of  spiritual  being,"     (I.  1, 38S.) 

"  The  mere  succession  of  ideas,  intuited  as  external,  gives  the  conception  of 
mechanical  motion.  But  the  soul  should  not  only  intuite  this  succession,  but 
herself  in  this  succession,  and  (since  she  only  intuites  her  own  activity)  should 
intuite  herself  as  active  in  this  succession."     {Ibid.,  S.  385.) 

Page  27,  Note  15. 

"  To  penetrate  the  '  inner  side '  of  objects,  i.  e.,  to  assume  that  appearances 
are  determinable,  with  respect  to  their  reality,  independently  of  the  ego." 
{Schelling,  Werke,  I.  1,  212,  note.) 

Page  29,  Note  16. 

The  early  writings  of  Schelling  furnish  not  only  the  most  important  source 
for  the  ideas  embodied  in  the  early  part  of  the  "  Phanomenologie  "  but  also  the 
most  enlightening  commentary  on  the  same.  If  Hegel  could  have  been  clear  he 
might  have  written  the  following  passage  and  foreshadowed  at  once  the  transi- 
tion which  the  present  essay  has  been  endeavoring  to  present. 

"  Doubtless  Kant  said  that  the  laws  of  nature  are  the  human  mind's  modes 
of  action,  the  conditions  under  which  our  intuition  itself  is  first  possible;  but 
he  added:  nature  is  nothing  distinct  from  these  laws,  it  is  only  a  progressive 
process  of  the  infinite  mind,  in  which  the  latter  first  comes  to  self-consciousness 
and  through  which  it  gives  to  this  self-consciousness  extension,  permanence, 
continuity  and  necessity."     {Schelling,  Werke,  I.  1,  361.) 

Page  29,  Note  17. 

This  indifference  which  the  law  and  the  law's  illustration  entertain  toward 
one  another  is  explained  for  Leibnitz  by  his  theory  of  the  "pre-established 
harmony'"  of  the  monads;  for  Berkeley  by  regarding  facts  as  tho  thoughts  of  a 
divine  intellect.  Cf.  the  quotation  above,  which  is  in  general  a  fair  enough 
representation  of  the  standpoint  of  German  idealism. 

Page  32,  Note  18. 

The  law  which  exhibits  the  absolute  identity  of  subject  and  object  is  arrived 

[41] 


at  by  Pichte  after  somewhat  the  same  fashion  as  the  dialectic  might  be  expected 
to  deduce  it.  The  starting  point  is  indifferent.  Any  empirical  fact  is  selected 
and  we  are  asked  to  think  away  the  empirical  conditions.  (In  Hegel  the 
accidental  is  removed  in  the  dialectic  process.)  That  which  remains  and  which 
cannot  be  thought  away  is  then  recognized  as  something  presupposed  by  every 
empirical  fact.  This  is  the  mental  act  of  predicating  the  fact's  existence  and 
the  ego  is  this  act  or  activity.  The  ego  predicates  itself  through  its  mere  exist- 
ence and  exists  because  of  the  act  of  predication.  The  discovery  of  the  fact 
whose  existence  is  involved  in  its  own  defluition  is  the  aim  of  all  rationalism. 
For  Fichte  this  fact  is  the  ego,  the  ego  as  act  or  activity.     (1.  1,  91-98.) 

rage  33,   Note  19. 

'^Begierde,^^  i.  e.,  the  need  of  the  thinking  force- for  what  is  essential  to  it, 
but  which  is  not  yet  reality  in  the  sense  that  it  is  not  yet  realized.  Cf.  the  use 
of  the  terms  "A>a/r'  and  ''Begierde"  in  Fichte's  Bestimvnoig  des  Menschen. 
(I.  2,  176-198,  in  particular  in  the  context  of  page  187.)  Cf.  again  note  14,  the 
first  paragraph. 

Page  33,  Note  20. 

For  Fichte  the  object  of  philosophy  is  not  properly  a  construct  of  the  philos- 
opher himself.  The  object  expresses  itself  as  so  and  so ;  the  philosopher  is 
merely  observer  and  describer.  The  artificial  object  of  the  first  sort  is  dead 
concept  to  which  the  investigation  is  related  passively.  In  the  case  of  the 
improper  object  of  philosophy  attention  is  directed  to  the  matter  (as  the  acci- 
dental) and  not  to  the  form,  the  self  active  power  (Kraft).  Tne  matter 
being  passive,  the  object  is  then  appearance,  whereas  the  proper  object  is 
concept.  The  proper  object  is  active  and  living  concept  and  through  its  necessity 
philosophical  knowledge  is  created.  The  philosopher  observes  the  behavior  of 
the  ego.     "He  proposes  an  experiment."     (I.  1,  454.) 

Cf.  Note  24,  last  two  quotations. 

Again,  according  to  the  Wissenschaftslehre,  every  purposive  activity, 
mental  or  physical,  is  accompanied  by  the  "  intellectual  intuition  "  of  the  con- 
sciousness of  self.  Intellectual  intuition  and  sensuous  intuition  never  occur 
separately  but  always  in  conjunction.  Thus  the  intellectual  intuition  is  viewed 
as  the  source  of  life  (activity),  in  the  world  of  sense  and  without  it  the  sensuous 
world  is  conceived  as  dead.     {Ibid,  S.  463.) 

Cf.  the  following  quotation  from  Schelling:  "  We  awake  from  the  intel- 
lectual intuition  as  from  the  state  of  death.  We  awake  through  reflection,  i.  e., 
through  necessitated  return  to  ourselves.  But  without  opposition  is  no  return; 
without  an  object  no  reflection  is  thinkable.  An  activity  is  living  if  it  be  di- 
rected to  objects  alone,  dead  if  it  lose  itself  in  itself.  But  man  should  be  neither 
lifeless  nor  merely  living  being.  His  activity  turns  of  necessity  to  objects  but 
as  necessarily  does  it  turn  back  to  himself.  Through  the  former  does  he  distin- 
guish himself  from  the  lifeless,  through  the  latter  from  merely  living  (animal) 
being."     (I.  1,  325.) 

Cf .  Note  6. 

Again:  -'That  which  is  object  is  something  dead,  passive,  self -capable  of 
no  action,  and  only  object,  of  action."     (I.  1,  367.) 

[42] 


Page  34,  Note  2i. 

In  the  following  passage  from  Schelling  the  non-ego  is  for  the  dogmatist  the 
absolute.     For  the  idealist  such  an  absolute  disappears  in  the  light  of  criticism. 

"I  understand  you,  dear  friend!  You  conceive  it  more  sublime  to  contest 
an  absolute  power  and,  fighting,  to  succumb,  than  to  insure  yourself  in  the  first 
place  against  all  risk  through  the  assumption  of  a  moral  God.  Certainly  this 
struggle  against  the  infinite  is  not  alone  the  most  sublime  that  a  man  can  con- 
ceive, but  is  on  my  view,  itself  the  principle  of  all  sublimity.  But  I  should  like 
to  know  how  you  will  find  in  dogmatism  an  explanation  of  the  power  by  which 
man  opposes  himself  to  the  absolute,  as  well  as  of  the  feeling  which  accompanies 
the  struggle.  The  consistent  dogmatism  does  not  succumb  through  strife  but 
through  acquiescence,  not  through  a  violent  but  through  a  voluntary  destruc- 
tion, through  quiet  surrender  of  myself  to  the  absolute  object."     (I.  1,  284.) 

Page  34,  Note  22. 

The  terms  are  Fichte's. 

Cf.  "  I  will  that  I  be  lord  of  nature  and  that  nature  be  my  servant;  I  will 
that  I  have  over  her  an  influence  appropriate  to  my  own  power  {Kraft),  but 
that  she  have  none  over  me."     (I.  2,  192-93.) 

"So  long  as  man  remains  in  the  domain  of  nature,  is  he  in  the  most  appro- 
priate sense  of  the  word,  as  he  can  be  loi'd  of  himself,  lord  of  nature.  He 
knows  the  objective  world  in  her  determinate  limits,  over  which  she  dare  not 
impose.  In  that  he  represents  the  object  to  himself,  in  that  he  prescribes  for 
the  object  form  and  consistency,  does  he  dominate  the  same.  He  has  nothing 
to  fear  from  it,  for  he  has  himself  prescribed  its  limitations."  {Schelling, 
Werke,  I.  1,  337.) 

Page  35,  Note  23. 

Hegel  is  frequently  nothing  but  Schelling  rendered  obscurely.  The  method 
of  thesis,  antithesis  and  synthesis  is  illustrated  in  the  following  passage: 

"Whosoever  has  reflected  concerning  Stoicism  and  Epicureanism,  the  two 
most  contradictory  of  moral  systems,  has  easily  seen  that  both  agree  in  the 
same  ultimate  end.  The  Stoic,  who  seeks  to  free  himself  of  the  influence  of 
external  objects,  struggles  after  happiness  no  less  than  the  Epicurean,  who  sub- 
merges himself  in  the  arms  of  the  world.  The  former  makes  himself  independent 
of  sensuous  needs,  in  that  he  satisfies  none,  the  latter,  in  that  he  satisfies  all. 

"The  one  seeks  to  attain  the  final  end,  absolute  happiness,  metaphysically , 
through  abstraction  from  all  sensibility ;  the  other  physically,  t\iToufc,h  cova.- 
plete  indulgence  of  sensibility.  But  the  Epicurean  was  metaphysicist,  in  that 
his  problem,  to  attain  happiness  through  the  successive  indulgence  of  individual 
needs,  was  unending.  The  Stoic  was  physicist,  since  his  abstraction  from  all 
sensibility  could  only  succeed  gradually  in  a  temporal  series.  The  one  would 
attain  his  final  end  through  progression,  the  other  through  regression.  Never- 
theless both  sought  the  same  ultimate  end,  the  end  of  absolute  happiness  and 
satisfaction  "     (Opp.  cit.  S.  829.) 

It  is  customary  to  say  that  in  the  absolute  freedom  and  necessity  coincide. 
The  absolute  both  prescribes  and  obeys  its  own  law.  When  the  absolute  is 
attained  all  is  object  of  knowledge  and  freedom  is  no  more.  If  the  absolute 
become  object  of  knowledge,  my  own  freedom  is  annihilated  by  the  absolute 
causality. 

[43] 


Page  35,  N^ote  24.  A 

Thu8  in  Fichte  that  which  introduces  limitations  is  the  objective,  which  is 
opposed  to  freedom  as  indeterminateness.  Whenever  I  think,  I  think  something 
determinate.  "I  hold  myself  with  freedom  in  this  sphere  when  I  view  myself 
and  /  a77i  held  through  this  sphere  and  limited  by  it."     (I.  1,  492.) 

The  view  of  Schelling  is  the  same  : 

"Thus  I  will  be  conscious  of  my  freedom  only  in  so  far  as  I  feel  myself  con- 
trolled in  reference  to  the  object. — JVo  consciousness  of  the  object  without 
consciousness  of  freedom,  no  consciousness  ofjreedom  without  consciousness 
of  the  object."    (I.  1,  371.) 

rage  36,  Note  25. 

"Now  along  with  absolute  freedom  no  self -consciousness  is  thinkable.  An 
activity,  for  which  there  exists  no  object,  no  opposition,  never  returns  to  itself. 
Only  through  return  to  itself  does  consciousness  arise.  Only  limited  reality  is 
actuality  for  us.  {Schelling,  Werke,  I.  1,  324.)  Again:  "When  an  activity 
which  is  no  longer  limited  by  objects  and  which  is  wholly  absolute,  is  no  longer 
accompanied  by  any  consciousness;  when  unlimited  activity  is  identical  with  ab- 
solute rest;  when  the  supreme  moment  of  being  borders  on  non-being;  then  does 
criticism  as  well  as  dogmatism  involve  self -destruction.  Does  the  latter  demand 
that  I  be  submerged  in  the  absolute  object,  so  must  conversely  the  former  demand 
that  all  which  is  object  shall  disappear  in  the  intellectual  intuition  of  myself.  In 
both  cases  all  is  for  me  object,  and  at  the  same  time  all  consciousness  of  myself 
as  subject  is  lost.     My  reality  disappears  in  the  infinite."     {Ibid,  6'.  527.) 

[44] 


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